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I. INTRODUCTION 
"We are a nation of adventurers."1 Since this country's incep-
tion, Americans have been characterized as rugged, adventurous, 
extremely competitive, and fiercely independent. These charac-
teristics have led us to the exploration of the polar ice caps, the 
oceans depths, and several moon landings. We work hard and we 
play hard. We value our leisure time and place great emphasis on 
recreational pursuits. As a nation, we are involved in a variety of 
recreational activities ranging from camping, hunting, horseback 
riding, football, and skiing to scuba diving, sky-diving, hang-glid-
ing, whitewater rafting, racing, mountaineering, and bungee 
jumping. 
The individual desire to participate in a wide gamut of recrea-
tional activities has led to the establishment of businesses that 
cater to these particular interests, many of which require specific 
instruction and involve various degrees of risk. The increasing 
popularity of various sports creates the risk of increased litigation 
resulting from injuries that have occurred from individual partici-
pation in these sports. This litigation directly affects the industry 
operators that cater to these activities and brings up two ques-
tions. First, how are they to protect themselves from liability? Sec-
ond, how can we, as a society, ensure that a proper standard of 
care is exercised? 
In order to protect their interests, these industries have 
responded by implementing exculpatory agreements, including 
"release of liability," "assumption of the risk," "statement of 
understanding" and "consent not to sue" agreements. They are 
used in virtually every sport. Americans are under the false 
impression that the requirement of signing such forms is just a 
1. Leslie Hastings, Playing with Liability: The Risk Release in High Risk Sports, 
24 CAL. w. L. REV. 127, 127 (1988). 
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futile exercise by the provider to instill fear in the participant;2 
that these forms are invalid in the eyes of the law, and that the 
participants' rights remain intact after signing a release. How-
ever, in the context of recreational activities, many jurisdictions 
are upholding the validity of these exculpatory agreements. This 
article examines the courts' reasoning in various decisions involv-
ing exculpatory agreements. It also explores the consequences of 
these decisions, including which party undertakes the risk, which 
party bears the costs and whether the costs associated with the 
risks outweigh the individual's right to participate freely in the 
activity of their choice. Finally, the article proposes that if mod-
ern society values the right of its citizens to freely and voluntarily 
participate in recreational activities of their choosing, then it must 
assume responsibility for the economic consequences that are 
likely to result from such a right. 
II. BACKGROUND OF ExcULPATORY AGREEMENTS 
A. Contract Versus Tort 
"[Exculpatory agreements] stand at the crossroads of two 
competing principles: freedom of contract and responsibility for 
damages caused by one's own negligent acts."3 The dilemma 
places an individual's personal freedom to enter into a voluntary 
agreement (contract) against strong policy considerations that 
protect that individual from unreasonable risks (tort). Contract 
obligations are created to enforce promises of present and future 
intentions as opposed to tort obligations which are imposed by law 
on policy considerations to avoid some kind ofloss to others.4 
It has often been assumed that as between parties to a con-
tract or bargaining transaction, tort as well as contract obli-
gations can be disclaimed if this is clearly and unmistakably 
done so that the intent of both parties is clearly manifested 
... But since tort obligations are based on policy considera-
tions apart from manifest intent, the extent to which such 
obligations can be impaired by contract depends a great deal 
on the relationship between the parties, the nature of the 
2. Sometimes, these forms are viewed as a means of showing legal superiority 
over the person signing. 
3. Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F.Supp. 472, 474 (D. Colo. 1992) 
(citing Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989)). 
4. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRossER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTS§ 92, at 
656 (5th ed. 1984). 
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bargaining transaction, and the type ofloss for which liabil-
ity is disclaimed.5 
1. The Relationship of the Parties & the Nature of the 
Bargaining Transaction 
In the context of recreational activities, the relationship ofthe 
parties and the nature of the bargaining transaction both lead to 
the conclusion that tort obligations can be disclaimed. In this 
arena, a relationship is created when an individual voluntarily 
chooses to participate in an activity that may be beneficial, but not 
essential. Usually, the provider- the party with the superior bar-
gaining strength - makes the participant's involvement dependent 
upon the execution of an exculpatory agreement. This provides 
the participant only one option: go elsewhere if the contract is not 
satisfactory. Several jurisdictions have held that although these 
types of contracts are contracts of adhesion, they are enforceable 
subject to two limitations: (1) the contract or provisions fall within 
the reasonable expectations of the party with the inferior bargain-
ing power and (2) the contract is not unduly oppressive or 
unconscionable. 6 
a. Reasonable Expectations 
A participant in a recreational activity is made aware of the 
risks involved and the rights being waived when signing the con-
tract.7 Consequently, the courts look to the terms of the waiver of 
liability or assumption of the risk to determine whether the provi-
sions fall within the participant's expectations. In Anderson v. 
Eby,8 a case involving a snow-mobile, the court held that the 
"[p]laintiffs claim that her inexperience with snowmobiles pre-
vented her from fully understanding the implications of the 
waiver is not relevant to [the] inquiry. Rather, we look only to the 
terms of the waiver itself."9 The court determined that "[i]t would 
be difficult to draft a more plain statement of a waiver" as the one 
used by the defendant provider.10 In Wheelock v. Sport Kites, 
5. Id. 
6. Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1715, 1736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); 
Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730, 735 (D. Haw. 1993). 
7. As discussed more fully below, many jurisdictions have barred defendants 
from the defense of exculpatory clauses where the clauses have been vague, 
inconspicuous, boiler plate, difficult to comprehend, or in small size lettering. 
8. 998 F.2d 858 (lOth Cir. 1993). 
9. Id. at 862. 
10. ld. 
4
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Inc., 11 a paragliding case, the participant expressly and volunta-
rily assJ.lllled the risk of death or injury that may result from his 
participating in the activity.12 The wife of the decedent brought 
the suit claiming that "while injury or death caused by treacher-
ous winds, improper landings, or collision with an obstacle are 
'apparent' risks, the risk which befell [the decedent] -the simulta-
neous breaking of all lines connecting him to the parachute - was 
not apparent."13 The court held in relevant part that: 
The risk which befell [the decedent] was the risk of death. 
[The decedent] expressly assumed this risk. Plaintiff could 
characterize it in many different ways, but the fact is that 
[the decedent] assumed the risk of death. Moreover, the 
apparent cause of [his] fall and subsequent death - equip-
ment failure - is an obvious risk in paragliding and other 
"air" sports. 14 
b. Unconscionability and Oppressiveness 
Unconscionability and oppressiveness of the contract are the 
second factors which the courts look to in determining whether an 
adhesion contract is enforceable. 
[U]nconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive 
element. The procedural element focuses on two factors: 
oppression and surprise. Oppression arises from an inequal-
ity of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation 
and an absence of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the 
extent to which the terms of the bargain are hidden in a 
"prolix printed form" drafted by a party in a superior bar-
gaining position. Substantive unconscionability inquires 
into whether the one-sidedness of an agreement is objec-
tively justified. This component is tied to procedural uncon-
scionability and requires a balancing test, such that "the 
greater the unfair surprise or inequality of bargaining 
power, the less reasonable the risk of reallocation which will 
be tolerated."15 
Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 16 a 1993 California appellate court 
case, addressed the question of unconscionability where a skier 
11. 839 F. Supp. 730 (D. Haw. 1993). 
12. Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F.Supp. 730, 735-36 (D. Haw. 1993). 
13. Id. at 735. 
14. ld. at 736. 
15. Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1715, 1736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(citing Kurashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d 606, 613-614 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988)) (citations omitted). 
16. 17 Cal. App. 4th 1715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
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signed a release agreeing to accept his equipment "as is" and 
assuming the risks associated with its use. 17 The cour:t deter-
mined that the agreement signed by the skier was not unconscion-
able because there were no facts that, when applied to the 
foregoing rules, would make the agreement unenforceable.18 
The concept that "[t]he bargaining between the parties must 
be 'free and open"'19 has prompted courts to hold that exculpatory 
agreements, within the context of recreational activities, are not 
adhesion contracts. 2° For example, "Colorado defines an adhesion 
contract as 'generally not bargained for, but imposed on the public 
for a necessary service on a take it or leave it basis."'21 However, 
although the provider may require acceptance ofthe agreement on 
a "take it or leave it basis" (many times as a prerequisite to insur-
ance coverage), the agreement is not necessarily considered an 
adhesion contract. Colorado requires "a showing that the parties 
were greatly disparate in bargaining power, that there was no 
opportunity for negotiation, or that [the] services could not be 
obtained elsewhere."22 Consideration of relative bargaining 
strength requires that the activity be deemed essential to the pub-
lic. In Banfield v. Louis,23 a Florida case in which a cyclist was 
injured while participating in a multi-city triathlon, the court held 
that: 
The service provided herein can hardly be termed essential. 
It is a leisure time activity put on for people who desire to 
enter such an event. People are not compelled to enter the 
event but are merely invited to take part. If they desire to 
take part, they are required to sign the entry and release 
form. The relative bargaining strengths of the parties does 
17. Id. at 1723. 
18. ld. at 1737. 
19. Marshall v. Blue Springs Corp., 641 N.E.2d 92, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
20. Banfield v. Louis, 589 So.2d 441, 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Bauer v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472, 474-75 (D. Colo. 1992). 
21. Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F.Supp. 472,475 (D. Colo. 1992) 
(citing Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981)). The Jones court "held that 
the agreement was not an adhesion contract and that the party seeking exculpation 
did not possess a decisive bargaining advantage 'because the service provided ... was 
not an essential service.'" Jones, 623 P.2d at 377-78 (citation omitted). 
22. Bauer, 788 F. Supp. at 475 (quoting Clinic Masters v. District Court, 556 
P.2d 473 (1976)). But see Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1715, 1737 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993), where an injured skier sued the ski shop which had rented him 
the equipment. On appeal the skiier claimed that "it was impossible for any skier in 
the United States to ... rent bindings from a ski shop ... without being required to 
sign an attempted disclaimer form." ld. The court did not address his contention, 
claiming that it was not raised at trial. I d. 
23. 589 So.2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
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not come into play absent a compelling public interest in the 
transaction. 
The transaction raises a voluntary relationship between 
the parties ... These are not the conditions from which con-
tracts of adhesion arise. 24 
B. Commonly Used Exculpatory Agreements 
7 
Exculpatory agreements are commonly referred to as a 
release. "A release is a contract in which one party agrees to 
abandon or relinquish a claim, obligation or cause of action 
against another party."25 To date, at least thirty-six states have 
produced decisions upholding the validity of exculpatory agree-
ments in a wide range of sporting activities.26 The two most com-
24. Banfield, 589 So.2d at 444-45 (quoting Okura v. United States Cycling 
Federation, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1462, 1468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)). 
25. Boyce v. West, 862 P.2d 592, 595 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
26. See Barnes v. Birmingham lnt'l Raceway, Inc. 551 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1989); 
Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1978); Frensley v. National Fire Ins. Co. of 
Hartford, 856 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1988)(Arkansas); Madison & Y.M.C.A. v. Superior 
Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Hanover Ins. Co. v. American Dist. 
Telegraph Co., 1991 WL 269106 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991); Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. 
Simkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1989); Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions, 571 So. 2d 92 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Bodyslimmer, Inc. v. Sanford, 398 S.E.2d 840 (Ga. 1990); 
Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 695 P.2d 361 (Idaho 1984); Bien v. Fox Meadow Farms Ltd., 
574 N.E.2d 1311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); General Bargain Ctr. v. American Alarm Co., 
430 N.E.2d 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746 
(Iowa 1988); Anderson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 790 P.2d 438 (Kan. 1990); Jones v. 
Hnana, 814 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1987); Southwestern Sugar Molasses Co. v. River 
Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411 (1959)(Louisiana); Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485 (Md. 
1986); Minassian v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 509 N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. 1987); 
Valasquez v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Schlobohm 
v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. 1982); Mayer v. Howard, 370 N.W.2d 93 
(Neb. 1985); Chenausky v. Chenausky, 509 A.2d 156 (N.H. 1986); Wade v. Park View, 
Inc., 96 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1953); Valuable Holding Corp. v. Midtown Vault Corp., 120 
A.D.2d 356 (N.Y. 1986); Rose v. Herring Tractor & Truck Co., 267 S.E.2d 717 (N.C. 
1980); Orlett v. Suburban Propane, 561 N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio 1989) Mann v. Wetter, 785 
P.2d 1064 (Or. 1990); Gimpel v. Host Enterprises, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 
1986); Corrente v. Conforti & Eisele Co., 468 A.2d920 (R.I. 1983); Huckaby v. 
Confederate Motor Speedway, Inc., 281 S.E.2d 223 (S.C. 1981); Derr Constr. Co. v. 
City of Houston, 846 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Zollman v. Myers, 797 F. Supp. 
923 (D. Utah 1992); Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 459 A.2d 97 (Vt. 1983); Scott 
v. Pacifi W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992); Krazek v. Mountain River 
Tours, Inc., 884 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1989)(West Virginia); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 373 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1985); Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057 
(Wyo. 1986); See also Mark A. Hruska, Risk Management '96, Seminar at the Diving 
Equipment & Marketing Association Trade Show (Jan. 19, 1996) [hereinafter DEMA]; 
William Turbeville, II, Product Liability Problems (And Solutions) For Dive Store 
Owners, DEMA (Jan. 20, 1996). 
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monly used releases are the waiver of liability and the express 
assumption of risk. 
1. Waiver of Liability 
A waiver or release of liability is a written instrument in 
which the participant agrees not to hold the provider liable for any 
injuries or damages resulting from the provider's negligence. 27 
The release need not be perfect,28 but it must "constitute[] a clear 
and unequivocal waiver with specific reference to a [provider's] 
negligence [to] be sufficient .... [It] must be clear, unambiguous 
and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties."29 Moreover, 
'"the law imposes no requirement that [the participant] have had 
a specific knowledge of the particular risk ... .' Not every possible 
specific act of negligence by the [provider] must be spelled out in 
the agreement or discussed by the parties."30 
2. Assumption of Risk 
The California appellate court has defined an express 
assumption of the risk as one "when the [participant], in advance, 
expressly consents ' ... to relieve the [provider] of an obligation of 
conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a 
known risk arising from what the [provider] is to do or leave 
undone .... The result is that ... being under no duty, [the pro-
vider] cannot be charged with negligence."'31 In other words, the 
result is identical to the waiver ofliability because the assumption 
of risk agreement exculpates by shifting the duty from the pro-
vider to the participant. Thus there can be no negligence where 
there is no duty.32 Although assumption of the risk releases pre-
suppose that the participant assumes only known risks, other 
courts have held that not all risks must be known when the plain-
tiff elects to assume all risks. "[K]nowledge of a particular risk is 
27. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990). 
28. Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 748, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting National & Int'l Bhd. of St. Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 
App. 3d 934, 938 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)). 
29. Id. at 755 (quoting Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 597-98 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988)). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 68, at 484. 
30. Paralift, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 4th at 757 (quoting Madison, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 
601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)) (citation omitted). 
31. Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 3d 758, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990) (internal citations omitted). 
32. "Identical in result to a release of liability which exculpates for ordinary 
negligence if it occurs, express and primary implied assumption of risk exculpate by 
shifting the duty of care from the [provider] to the [participant], thus preventing 
negligence from occurring." Boyce v. West, 862 P.2d 592, 598 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
8
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unnecessary when there is an express agreement to assume all 
risk; by express agreement a '[participant] may undertake to 
assume all of the risks of a particular ... situation, whether they 
are known or unknown to him."'33 
The concept of assumption of risk has been so fully embraced 
in the area of recreational activities that even where an exculpa-
tory agreement has not been signed by co-participants in a sport-
ing activity, such as a sandlot football game,34 or where two 
friends go water-skiing,35 the courts have recognized only a lim-
ited duty of care imposing liability "for ordinary careless con-
duct."36 In Knight v. Jewett37 and Ford v. Gouin,38 both California 
Supreme Court cases, the court explained "that vigorous partici-
pation in such sporting events likely would be chilled if legal lia-
bility were to be imposed on a participant on the basis of his or her 
ordinary careless conduct."39 The same California court concluded 
that 
[t]he overwhelming majority of the cases, both within and 
outside California, that have addressed the issue of co-par-
ticipant liability in [team sports], have concluded that it is 
improper to hold a sports participant liable to a co-partici-
pant for ordinary careless conduct committed during the 
sport - for example, for an injury resulting from a care-
lessly thrown ball or bat during a baseball game - and that 
liability properly may be imposed on a participant only when 
he or she intentionally injures another player or engages in 
reckless conduct that is totally outside the range of the ordi-
nary activity involved in the sport.40 
"Additionally, imposing such liability might well deter friends 
from voluntarily assisting one another in such potentially risky 
sports."41 
This concept falls within the doctrine of primary assumption 
of the risk. It occurs when: the [participant] voluntarily 
enters into some relation with the [provider], with knowl-
33. Id. at 598 (quoting Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 601 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988)(internal citations ommitted)). 
34. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
35. Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992). 
36. Id. at 728 (citing Knight, 834 P.2d at 710). 
37. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
38. 837 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992). 
39. 834 P.2d at 728 (citing Knight, 834 P.2d at 710). 
40. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318 (The court gave as an example, Gauvin v. Clark, 
537 N.E.2d 94, 96-97 (Mass. 1989)). 
41. Ford, 834 P.2d at 728. 
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edge that the [provider} will not protect him against one or 
more future risks that may arise from the relation. He may 
then be regarded as tacitly or impliedly consenting to the 
negligence, and agreeing to take his own chances.42 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, in Ford, lends 
further support to the traditional approach to the concept of 
assumption of risk in general, and implied assumption of risk in 
particular, by stating in relevant part: 
I adhere to the traditional approach to implied assumption 
of risk under which a [participant's} voluntary choice to con-
front a known risk will bar recovery in an action for negli-
gence. The doctrine of assumption of risk recognizes that 
liberty implies responsibility and that respect for choices 
freely made is enhanced, not diminished, when one who vol-
untarily confronts a specific, known risk is precluded from 
shifting to another the costs of an injury that is the direct 
result of that choice.43 
C. Recreational Case Law 
Exculpatory agreements have traditionally been disfavored.44 
Courts invalidated these agreements for a variety of reasons. 
Among these reasons are: as being against public policy, improper 
drafting, print size, ambiguity, and "legal-eze" language rendering 
the contract not understandable.45 
However, by 1988, the use and acceptance of exculpatory 
agreements was firmly established within the recreational sports 
arena. The industry learned from its prior mistakes by increasing 
type size and using easily understandable English instead of tech-
nical legal terms, thus removing any objection as to the clarity or 
ambiguity of the rights being waived. They printed pertinent 
clauses detailing the waiver of rights in larger boldfaced lettering 
drawing the participant's attention to the gravity of the waiver. 
In Madison v. Superior Court,46 in which a nineteen year-old 
scuba diving student drowned while participating in defendant's 
training course, the court explained that "[a]s long as the release 
42. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 68, at 481. 
43. Ford, 834 P.2d at 732. 
44. Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F.Supp. 472,474 (D. Colo. 1992) 
(citing Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. 1989)). 
45. See Hastings, supra note 1, passim. 
46. 203 Cal. App. 3d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
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constitutes a clear and unequivocal waiver with specific reference 
to a [provider's] negligence, it will be sufficient."47 
Although the tide had changed, whenever these drafting defi-
ciencies reemerged, courts quickly invalidated the agreement. As 
recently as 1993, a federal district court held that a release not 
specifically shifting responsibility from the defendant to the plain-
tiff cannot relieve the defendant from liability.48 In Ghoinis v. 
Deer Valley Resort Co.,49 the defendant ski resort operator moved 
for summary judgment based primarily upon a release agreement 
signed by the injured skier.50 The court found that the words "as 
is" did not qualify as an express disclaimer of all implied warran-
ties for the use of the ski equipment.51 Additionally, it found that 
the term, "as is," was not "conspicuous" as contemplated in Utah's 
code.52 Moreover, it held that the term was "slipped into para-
graph 1, without any indication to the average consumer that they 
are words of art with distinct legal meaning."53 Finally, the court 
held that the indemnity provision of paragraph 3 did not "provide 
protection to Deer Valley as it is capable of being read by a lay 
consumer as only obligating the renter to an indemnity obligation 
47. Id. at 597. The court held the agreement signed by a scuba diving student 
valid and explained that 
[i]t would be difficult to imagine language more clearly designed to put a 
layperson on notice of the significance and legal effect of subscribing to it. 
The emphasized references to the exemption and relief from "liability for 
personal injury, property damage or wrongful death caused by 
negligence" could not be more explicit. 
ld. at 598. See also Dombrowski v. City ofOmer, 502 N.W.2d 707,710 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993), in which the court held the waiver was "written with sufficient clarity, particu-
larly in view of the fact that it [was] captioned 'WAIVER OF LIABILITY,' to put a 
layman on notice that any right to bring a claim of liability for injury or damages 
arising out of participation in the event was being waived." Id. 
48. Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D. Utah 1993). 
49. 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993). 
50. I d. at 793. The first paragraph of the release agreement read, "I accept for 
use as is the equipment listed on this form, and accept full responsibility for the care 
of the equipment while it is in my possession." Id. at 792 n.2. 
51. ld. Recall that in Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1715, 1737 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993), the court held that the words "as is" were sufficient to exculpate 
the ski shop from liability for negligence. 
52. Id. "[A]ll implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all 
faults' or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention 
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty, if in 
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where a third party has been injured as a result of the use of the 
shop's equipment by the renter."54 
Notwithstanding the court's analysis in Ghoinis, the courts' 
focus generally shifted from an inspection of defective drafting to 
an analysis of public policy issues, the participant's required 
understanding of the inherent risks involved in the activity, and 
the intentions and expectations of the parties. 
1. Public Policy Issues 
In attempting to invalidate an exculpatory agreement, plain-
tiffs commonly argue that the agreement is against public inter-
est. Courts have delineated six factors used to determine whether 
an exculpatory agreement violates public policy: 
1. whether the agreement concerns a business of a type gen-
erally thought suitable for public regulation; 
2. whether the party seeking exculpation is engaged in per-
forming a service of great importance to the public, which 
is often a matter of practical necessity for some members 
of the public; 
3. whether the party holds themselves out as willing to per-
form this service for any member coming within certain 
established standards; 
4. As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the 
economic setting of the transaction, whether the party 
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of 
bargaining strength against any member of the public 
who seeks the party's services; 
5. In exercising a superior bargaining power, whether the 
party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion 
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby 
a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and 
obtain protection against negligence; and 
6. whether the person or property of the purchaser is placed 
under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of care-
lessness by the seller or the seller's agents.55 
54. I d. at 794 n.8. Paragraph 3 read, "I agree to hold harmless and indemnify the 
ski shop and its owners, agents and employees for any loss or damage, including any 
that results from claims for personal injury or property damage related to the use of 
this equipment, except reasonable wear and tear." Id. at 792 n.2. 
55. Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 3d 134, 149 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1991) (citing Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 598-99 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963))) 
(indented material paraphrased and listed for clarity). 
12
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol14/iss1/3
1997] EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS UNDER PRESSURE 13 
In Tunkl u. Regents of the University of California, 56 the central 
issue involved the validity of a liability release a patient was 
required to sign prior to hospital admission.57 The patient 
claimed that her injuries were a direct result of the physician's 
negligence.58 The California Supreme Court held the release 
invalid as against public interest because the hospital was provid-
ing an essential public service that placed its users in a position of 
inferior bargaining strength. 59 
Besides hospitalization, other courts have outlined banking 
transactions, escrow transactions, and activities involving com-
mon carriers as areas in which exculpatory agreements would be 
void as against public policy because the risks and numbers of 
participants involved would have a substantial impact on the pub-
lic.60 Additionally, exculpatory agreements have been overturned 
in areas of product liability where the agreement attempted to 
exempt the manufacturer of responsibility for injuries caused by 
defective products61 and in areas where the provider attempts to 
exempt himself from harm caused by his gross negligence.62 The 
First and Second District Courts of Appeal of Florida are an excep-
tion in that they have even gone as far as construing a release 
from liability for the provider's negligence as releasing the pro-
vider from liability for gross negligence. 63 
56. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
57. ld. at 442. 
58. Id. 
59. ld. 
60. Buchan, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 151; Okura v. United States Cycling Fed'n, 186 
Cal. App. 3d 1462, 1467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
61. See, e.g., Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730, 737 (D. Haw. 1993). 
This concept is squarely at odds with strict liability doctrine. The doctrine of strict 
liability is based not only on the public policy of discouraging the marketing and 
distribution of defective products, but also on the reasoning that a manufacturer is in 
a far better position than individual consumers to insure against the risk of injury 
and to distribute costs among consumers. Id. 
62. I d. at 736-37. In Wheelock, the court upheld the release, but held void as 
against public policy the portions which barred strict liability claims and "to the 
extent that it attempt[ed] to relieve defendants of liability for their gross negligence." 
ld. See also Faulkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1989). "Generally, agreements exculpating from the results of wilful and wanton 
misconduct are illegal." Id. at 946. 
63. In Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions, a race car driver died as a result of the 
gross negligence of the defendants. The court reasoned that 
[t]he release and waiver signed by the decedent clearly excused [the 
racing promoters] from liability for acts or omissions resulting from their 
own negligence "or otherwise." Since the term "negligence" as used in the 
release is not limited, it must be construed as intended to encompass all 
13
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However, in the sports context, the courts are upholding
exculpatory agreements as not against public policy focusing their
analysis on both the sanctity of freedom to contract and the volun-
tary nature of the participant's involvement. In Madison, a Cali-
fornia appellate court determined that "no public policy opposes
private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a consider-
ation, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise
have placed upon the other party.... 64 The court went on to
state that the decedent "entered into a private and voluntary
transaction in which, in exchange for an enrollment in a class
which he desired to take, he freely agreed to waive any claim
against the defendants for a negligent act by them."65 The court
concluded that "[t]his case involves no more a question of public
interest than does motorcross racing, sky diving, or motorcycle
dirt-bike riding."
66
In Banfield v. Louis,67 a Florida case, a cyclist who was
injured while participating in a triathlon event contested the
validity of the waiver on the grounds that it should be declared
void as against public policy.6" The cyclist reasoned that the
waiver should be invalidated because it would encourage the spon-
sors to cut corners on safety and cause the sponsors to feel that
they did not need to take adequate precautions to protect the par-
ticipants, thus adversely affecting the public interest.69 The court,
however, found that although the cyclist had expressed legitimate
public safety concerns, "it is a matter of great public concern that
forms of negligence, simple or gross negligence, with only intentional
torts not being held subject to such an exculpatory clause.
Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions, 571 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
L. Luria & Son, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). But
see KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 68, at 484.
[Gin the basis either of common experience as to what is intended, or of
public policy to discourage aggravated wrongs, such agreements gener-
ally are not construed to cover the more extreme forms of negligence,
described as willful, wanton, reckless or gross, or to any conduct which
constitutes an intentional tort.
Id.
64. Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1963)).
65. Id. at 599.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. 589 So.2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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freedom of contract be not lightly interfered with."7 0 It further
warned:
Courts, therefore, should be guided by the rule of extreme
caution when called upon to declare transactions void as con-
trary to public policy and should refuse to strike down con-
tracts involving private relationships on this ground, unless
it be made clearly to appear that there has been some great
prejudice to the dominant public interest sufficient to over-
throw the fundamental public policy of the right to freedom of
contract between parties sui juris7 1
Additionally, in Kotovsky v. Ski Liberty Operating Corp., a
Pennsylvania case, the court upheld the validity of an exculpatory
agreement signed by a downhill ski racer, barring his claim.72
The ski racer was seriously injured when he failed to make a turn
and collided with a post situated along the side of the course.73
The court explained that "[t]he releases also did not contravene
public policy. They were contracts between private parties and
pertained only to the parties' private rights. They did not in any
way affect the rights of the public."74
Similarly, an Indiana court focusing once again on the volun-
tary nature of the plaintiff's involvement, upheld the release
signed by a scuba diving student in Marshall v. Blue Springs
Corp.75 The student was injured when he slipped and fell on a
dock.76 The court explained that the plaintiff did not choose to
take scuba diving lessons "for any reason other than his own
enjoyment. He was under no compulsion by an outside force to do
so."77 The court added that "[i]t is not the policy of the law to
restrict business dealings or to relieve a party of his own mistakes
of judgment... ."7
A scuba diving student was injured as a result of a previously
punctured eardrum during instruction given in a private swim-
ming pool in Baschuk v. Diver's Way Scuba, Inc.79 The student
70. Id. (quoting Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Williams, 17 So.2d 98, 101 (Fla.
1944)).
71. Id. at 446-47 (quoting Bituminous, 17 So.2d at 101-02) (emphasis added).
72. Kotovsky v. Ski Liberty Operating Corp., 603 A.2d 663 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 665-66.
75. 641 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
76. Id. at 94.
77. Id. at 96.
78. Id.
79. 618 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The plaintiff had read, filled out and
signed a statement of medical history and a liability release form exempting the
1997]
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claimed, among other arguments, that the liability release forms
she signed at the beginning of her course should be held invalid as
against public policy because a New York statute"° forbade such
agreements.8 1 The New York courts have held that the purpose of
the statute was to prevent places of recreation from exempting
themselves from liability for negligence by the paying public.8 2
Consistent with Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,3
the issue becomes one of public policy because pool operators hold
themselves out as willing to perform the service for any member of
the public who seeks to use it, and New York has determined that
recreational facilities open to the public are a business thought
suitable for regulation. In Baschuk, however, the court held that
the defendant's swimming pool was used for instructional pur-
poses, not recreational or amusement purposes, and that the
instructional fee was not a use fee as contemplated by the statute,
and therefore, fell outside the purview of the code.8 4
In Buchan v. United States Cycling Federation, Inc., a Califor-
nia case, a bicyclist was injured while participating in a race.8 5
The court held that the activity "did not involve the public inter-
est: defendants' business was not generally thought to be suitable
for public regulation; defendants did not perform a service of great
importance to the public; .. .and defendants' customers did not
place their persons under defendants' control."8 6
2. Participant's Required Understanding of the Inherent
Risks Involved
In addition to the public policy issues involved, a court's con-
cern is with participants' understanding of the inherent risks
involved. The focus is on the specificity of the release. The issue
defendant from all liability for personal injury to her during the course. Id. at 429. It
was after submitting the forms that she first discussed her history of ear problems
with the instructor, after which he requested she obtain a medical note from her
doctor. Id.
80. N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONs LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 1989). ("Agreements
exempting pools, gymnasiums, places of public amusement or recreation and similar
establishments from liability for negligence void and unenforceable . .
81. Baschuk, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
82. See, e.g., Meier v. Ma-Do Bars, Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
Geise v. Niagara County, 458 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
83. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
84. Baschuk, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
85. Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 3d 134 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
86. Id. at 150 (adopting the reasoning in Kurashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc., 200
Cal. App. 3d 606, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).
[Vol. 14:1
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is whether the participant is put on notice of the risks she is about
to assume. Although every possible risk need not be expressed,
the agreement must give the participant a general understanding
of the inherent dangers involved.
The Madison court specifically rejected the idea "that every
possible specific act of negligence of the defendant must be spelled
out in the agreement or even discussed by the parties.""7 The
court established the standard that it was "only necessary that
the act of negligence, which results in injury to the releasor, be
reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is
given."18 Recall that in Madison, a scuba diving student drowned
as a result of the instructor's negligence. There, the court con-
cluded that the instructor's negligent acts in failing to adequately
supervise the student was "clearly so related." 9
In National & International Brotherhood of Street Racers, Inc.
v. Superior Court,90 a race car driver was injured after his car left
the starting line in reverse gear and crashed into shipping con-
tainers. Upon being extricated from his car, the rescue personnel
twisted his body in such a manner so as to leave him a
quadriplegic. 91 The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the
release he signed did not include risks not inherent to racing, i.e.,
being improperly rescued. 92 The Street Racers court held that
"No be effective, a release need not achieve perfection; only on
Draftsman's Olympus is it feasible to combine the elegance of a
thrust indenture with the brevity of a stop sign.... It suffices that
a release ... express an agreement not to hold the released party
liable for negligence."93 The court stated that "[dirafters of
releases always face the problem of steering between the Scylla of
simplicity and the Charybdis of completeness .... If short and to
the point, a release will be challenged as failing to mention the
particular risk which caused a plaintiffs injuries .... If ... com-
prehensive, the release is attacked as unduly lengthy. .."9'
Similarly, in Deboer v. Florida Offroaders Driver's Associa-
tion,95 a Florida court held that "for a release to be effective, it is
87. Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. National & Int'l Bhd. of St. Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d
934, 936 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
91. Id. at 937.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 938.
94. Id.
95. 622 So.2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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not necessary to list each possible class of releasor or each possible
manner in which a releasor could be injured during an inherently
dangerous event. The possibilities are endless."9" In Deboer, a
spectator at a car racing event was injured when she attempted to
cross the race track after the race had commenced. 7 Admittance
to the event entailed signing a release and paying the entrance
fee.98 The court held that "[a]bsent impaired mental faculties, one
need not be an experienced spectator or competitor to recognize
the potential for injury," and because the release warned of the
possible dangers inherent to certain "Restricted Area[s]," the
release was upheld. 9
Compare the preceding holding with that in Ghionis v. Deer
Valley Resort Co.,'0° where the court overturned the release due to
the ambiguity of the words "as is."10 1 In Ghionis, because the
plaintiff was an attorney, the defendant, Deer Valley, requested
that the court hold her to a higher standard than that of a layper-
son due to her professional knowledge. 102 The court declined the
request stating that where an operator intends to exculpate him-
self from liability using a form release, the language of the release
must be clear and unambiguous enough for the average layperson
to understand.
10 3
In Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court,10 4 a suit was brought after
a skydiver was killed when he landed in the ocean instead of the
intended inland drop zone; the defendant moved for summary
judgment based on the risk release that the skydiver had
signed.' 0 5 The plaintiffs argued that the release should not be
upheld because of the specific conditions present prior to the
jump.1°6 The California appellate court upheld the release decid-
ing that the decedent had expressly assumed the risks of para-
96. Id. at 1136.
97. Id. at 1134. The race track was set up so that the spectators would have to
cross the race track in order to use the facilities that were set up in the pit area. Id. at
1135.
98. Id. at 1134-35.
99. Id. at 1136.
100. 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993).
101. Id. at 793.
102. Id. at 793 n.6.
103. Id.
104. 23 Cal. App. 4th 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
105. Id. at 753.
106. Id. at 752. The original subject matter of the release involved Perris Valley
Airport which was different from Del Mar Fairgrounds, where the sky diver met his
death. Id. Additionally, "Paralift increased the risk of harm to the decedent by letting
him out over cloud cover where the shore line was unknown." Id. at 753.
[Vol. 14:1
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chuting1 0 7 The release form required the decedent to sign or
initialize at twenty-two different places.10 8 Additionally, the dece-
dent was shown a video tape which explained the liability release
form, made him aware of the inherent risks involved in sky diving,
and advised him not to sign the release until obtaining advice
from independent counsel should he have any questions as to
what he was signing."°9
3. Intentions and Expectations of the Parties
Since Madison, the most innovative approach to exculpatory
agreement analysis centers on the subjective intentions and
expectations of the parties. This is in addition to the express
intent manifested by the signing of the release which takes the
analysis one step beyond the "meeting of the minds" that is essen-
tial to the finding of a valid contract.
The Madison court imputed the decedent's intent from his
express release of liability stating that, "[the decedent] expressly
manifested his intent to relieve the defendants of any duty to him
and to assume the entire risk of any injury."' 10 One year later, the
Colorado Supreme Court went beyond the express wording of the
agreement and looked to the experience of the plaintiff in order to
determine whether she was capable of understanding the risks
involved in horseback riding in Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v.
Simkin.111 Simkin, the plaintiff, brought an action against Heil
Valley Ranch to recover for injuries she sustained after the horse
she was riding "reared up and fell backwards onto [her], injuring
her severely."11 2 The court looked to her experience and concluded
that she was not a novice rider, and therefore the "risk that a
horse could rear and injure her was reasonably foreseeable to
someone with her experience."1 13
107. Id.at 757.
108. Id.at 752. Similar to the signature requirements in Paralift, the
Professional Association of Dive Instructors (PADI), the largest scuba diving
certification agency in the world, requires in their LIABILITY RELEASE AND EXPRESS
ASSUMPTION OF RisK, that the student not only sign the release, but must also initial
in seven different places specifically outlining the risks involved in the sport. See
Appendix, Exhibit I.
109. Id. at 753.
110. Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
111. Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1989)(en banc).
112. Id. at 783.
113. Id. at 785.
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In Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc.,1  an Illinois
case, a parachutist died after the lines of his parachute became
entangled, not allowing the parachute to slow his fall.115 Similar
to the court in Heil Valley Ranch, the Falkner court looked to fac-
tors external to the agreement, particularly the decedent's experi-
ence. The court concluded "that some risk of fatal injury is
ordinarily attendant to the sport of parachute jumping and that
the decedent, a former officer and pilot in the Army Air Corps,
would have been aware of this risk."116
This bifurcated analysis is evident in subsequent cases. For
instance, in Buchan v. United States Cycling Federation, Inc., the
court upheld the validity of the release, in part, because Buchan,
an experienced cyclist, acknowledged "that falls and crashes are
common occurrences in bicycle races and occur in about 75 percent
of all races."'1 7 In Bien v. Fox Meadow Farms Ltd.,118 an Illinois
case, a horse back rider was injured while participating in a lesson
in which she had signed an exculpatory agreement over a year
and a half prior to the lesson.1 19 The participant did not want to
ride the horse that eventually knocked her off because of his "ten-
dency to thrash his head after a jump," but decided to do so in
order to avoid riding another horse which she felt was "reckless
and unpredictable."' 20 After the first jump, the horse thrashed his
head and the participant notified the instructor of the problem.
1 21
After receiving her instructions to pull the reins tight after jump-
ing, she attempted another jump after which the horse reacted the
same.122 Upon receiving further instructions to pull the reins
even tighter, the participant proceeded with a third jump after
which her horse "began violently thrashing his head and ulti-
mately threw [her] off his back."' 23 The Bien court, relied on Har-
ris v. Walker, another horseback riding case decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court.124 In Harris, a horseback rider was injured when
her horse became frightened and threw her to the ground.
125
114. 533 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 945.
117. Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 3d 134, 148 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991).
118. 574 N.E.2d 1311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
119. Id. at 1313-14.
120. Id. at 1313.
121. Id. at 1314.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1315 (citing Harris v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1988)).
125. Harris, 519 N.E.2d at 917.
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Analogizing the Harris court's reasoning,. the Bien court found
that she was not "the most inexperienced of horseback riders," 26
and concluded that "[s]he, like the Harris plaintiff, could appreci-
ate the risk of being thrown from a horse. "12 Consequently, the
Bien court upheld the release and held that the injuries sustained
by the participant were encompassed in its language.
128
This same analysis resulted in an adverse ruling in the West
Virginia case, Murphy v. North American River Runners.129 Here,
the participant in a white-water rafting expedition was forcefully
thrown and injured when the outfitter tried to rescue other rafters
by intentionally bumping their raft into the other in an attempt to
dislodge it.' 30 The participant argued that because she was not
informed that rescue operations of this manner would be per-
formed while on the expedition, she did not contemplate this risk
when she signed the release agreement.' 31 The court agreed with
the participant, holding that "in order for the express agreement
to assume the risk to be effective, it must also appear that its
terms were intended by both parties to apply to the particular con-
duct of the defendant which has caused the harm."' 32
In Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., a Colorado case, the
plaintiff was participating in a horse-drawn wagon ride when the
neck yoke ring on the rear wagon broke.13 4 This allowed the
wagon to move forward, bumping its team of horses, frightening
them and causing them to bolt.' 35 They, in turn, hit the forward
wagon, on which the plaintiff was riding, causing her to be thrown
and injured.136 The release agreement referred "generally to the
significant element of risk associated with outdoor activities and
the inherent risks, dangers, and rigors involved in the activi-
ties."'3 7 However, the plaintiff argued "that risks created by faulty
equipment are not 'inherent risks' involved in activities 'associ-
ated with the outdoors.'"' 38 The defendant relied on Heil Valley
126. Bien, 574 N.E.2d at 1315 (quoting Harris, 519 N.E.2d at 917).
127. Id. at 1315.
128. Id.
129. Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1991).
130. Id. at 508.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 510.
133. 810 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1993).
134. Id. at 291.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Ranch for the principle that when the language in a release is
written broadly, it is reasonable to interpret "the intended cover-
age to be as broad as the risks that are obvious to experienced
participants." 139 The court decided that this interpretation did not
apply in the instant case because, "there is no evidence that [the
plaintiff] had any experience with horse drawn wagons."140
The analysis contained in the foregoing cases expresses the
importance of distinguishing activities such as scuba diving and
sky diving, where instruction is a prerequisite to participation and
where the participant has little, if any, knowledge as to the inher-
ent risks. In such sports, the specificity and clarity of the exculpa-
tory agreement is crucial. Although not every risk need be
included, particular attention must be given to outlining the
major risks involved. This same specificity would not apply to
advanced certifications or to situations where the participant has
had prior experience, and thus has an understanding of the risks
he is assuming.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS
At this point the reader should have an understanding of
what exculpatory agreements are, how they are constructed and
analyzed, and how they apply and are intertwined with recrea-
tional sports. The reader should also have an understanding of
how contemporary courts are interpreting them and the major pol-
icy reasons why they have become generally accepted in the con-
text of sports.
Whether dealing with a waiver of liability, a consent not to
sue, or an express assumption of risk, a release of any kind
implies a personal acceptance of responsibility; a conscious deci-
sion to accept the responsibility for the choices voluntarily made.
This Note will now examine the practical ramifications of
accepting that responsibility.
First, this Note will look at the problems involved with reliev-
ing the industry of responsibility and examine the consequences
as they relate to the principles of tort law. In other words, if
exculpatory agreements are to be upheld, how is the public to be
assured that adequate safety precautions are being taken? The
answers to this come from two distinct avenues: self-regulation by
the industry, and where this fails as an acceptable option or due
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to practical necessities, state regulation by governmental
authorities.
Next, this Note will examine the problem of what occurs if
exculpatory agreements are not upheld. How can we ensure the
survival of these industries? How can we ensure the perpetuation
of these sports? Should we care? And if we don't, what happens to
the individual's ability to participate in this wide range of
activities?
Third, who ultimately absorbs the costs of this philosophy? In
answering this question, this Note will go beyond the immediate
results of a sports injury. Who insures against pain and suffering,
loss of earning capacity, unemployment and disability? Who takes
care of the children and the spouses of the participants injured or
killed as a result of participation in the sports they decide to pur-
sue? And if there is insurance available to cover some of these
consequences, will the cost be prohibitive?
Fourth, if there is a choice as to when exculpatory agreements
are to apply, is there some test or standard to evaluate this deci-
sion? Should the validity of the exculpatory agreement depend on
the type of sport and ultimately the type of risk involved? If not,
should their validity depend upon a question of public policy? And
if so, should public policy have an impact in the sports context?
Finally, what is to be done about minors in regards to excul-
patory agreements? Are they to be excluded and not be given the
opportunities to participate in these activities? Are we to stifle
their curiosity and bar the potential of enriching their lives as a
result of participation in these activities? Or are the risks involved
just too high?
A. Public Safety Considerations
Exculpatory agreements are disfavored in the law because
they remove the deterrence that Tort Law provides against unrea-
sonable risks. Thus, if these agreements are to be upheld, how is
the public to be assured that adequate safety precautions are
being taken? The economic theory suggests the industry will self-
regulate to the point of optimizing their own economic benefit, i.e.,
bad reputation leads to lack of business. However, is reliance on
this theory sufficient to guarantee the safety of participants?
1. Self-Regulation
This Note examines the scuba diving industry in order to
determine whether self-regulation is sufficient to ensure the
19971
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safety of participants. Scuba diving provides an optimal model
because of its increasing popularity worldwide. It is a sport that is
exciting, adventurous, and carries some element of risk, but at the
same time provides a fulfilling experience to those who choose to
participate. The Professional Association of Diving Instructors,
("PADI"), the largest scuba diving certification agency in the
world, will be used as an example of effective self-regulation.
Scuba diving can be, and is being, enjoyed by the entire family
(12 years and older). However, safe participation requires educa-
tion and training. PADI accomplishes this through a scuba certifi-
cation course. Upon completion of the course the student receives
a certification card ("c-card") which enables the student to fill his
or her tanks with compressed air, rent equipment, and actually
participate in the sport. Prior to instituting the certification
requirements, there were increasing numbers of diving injuries
and fatalities. These were a direct result of people engaging in the
sport who were not aware of the inherent risks involved with
breathing air at depth.
PADI began in 1966 and was the first certification agency to
introduce minimum certification requirements.14 1 It was also the
first to produce a "positive identification" c-card which included
the diver's picture. 142 This assured the dive operator that the per-
son presenting the card was actually the person qualified to par-
ticipate in the sport. In 1967, PADI was the first to introduce a
continuing education system.'4 3 Prior to this, a student was
taught everything in one lengthy course. This resulted in the stu-
dent retaining only a portion of what he or she had learned. Con-
sequently, a great number of injuries and fatalities continued to
occur. By breaking down the training into different certifications,
PADI permits the student to concentrate on the basic skills
required for that particular level. As a result, the student retains
a greater percentage of the knowledge, and thus masters the skills
required at each respective level. The training courses also allow
for a greater number of people to safely participate in the sport.
As divers desire to pursue more demanding types of dives, he or
she may then obtain additional training and go on to higher levels
of certification. Divers may receive training and certification in
specialty areas of diving, such as night diving, deep diving, drift
141. Barry Shuster, The PADI Chronicles - A Quarter Century of The Undersea
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diving, underwater photography, and cave diving. By participat-
ing in this step by step process, the diver applies the skills learned
and perfects those skills under the watchful eye of an experienced
certified instructor, thus developing the participant into a more
confident, better qualified, and safer diver.
Among the many firsts PADI introduced to the dive industry
was a national air analysis program in 1977, encouraging consis-
tent high quality air standards for the industry;' it was the first
organization to fund dive table research which established safer
limits for its students; and in 1979, it established the first quality
assurance department among certification agencies in the indus-
try, enabling the strict enforcement of standards and ensuring a
consistent, high quality level of education and training for PADI
students.
45
PADI maintains five full-time employees in their Quality
Assurance Department ("QA"), and has additional QA staff mem-
bers in all of its international offices. The QA staff members poll
standards violations, participate in enforcement of trademark and
copyright, review all accidents and training reports, send out
acknowledgment certificates to instructors who have displayed
superior teaching skills, and resolve certification issues where stu-
dents have not received their c-cards .146 The QA staff members'
administrative actions are detailed in a quarterly publication, The
Undersea Journal, which is distributed to all PADI instructors.
These actions range from counseling to termination or expulsion
of members, 47 expulsion occurring where violations are more
serious and the QA Department has determined that the individ-
ual is beyond retraining.' 4S However, in the last five years their
approach has focused on education and remediation. Other agen-
cies are now following PADI's lead when it comes to quality
assurance.
In 1969 PADI issued 25,000 certifications, 49 in 1994, it
issued 625,487 certifications, 150 and 1995 figures exceeded
700,000 certifications in a single year.' 5 ' 1996 marks PADI's thir-
144. PADI Celebrates its 30th Year!, UNDERSEA J., First Quarter, 1996, at 6.
145. Id.
146. Interview with Peggy McCall, Manager of Quality Assurance for PADI, in
New Orleans, La. at DEMA (Jan. 20, 1996); interview with Dana Stuart, Vice
President of Operations for PADI, in New Orleans, La. at DEMA (Jan. 20, 1996).
147. The term "members" means dive instructors and dive masters.
148. Id.
149. Shuster, supra note 141, at 4.
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tieth year of involvement in the dive industry. With over 75,000
members, PADI is involved in scuba instruction in more than 175
countries and produces training materials in eighteen lan-
guages.152 PADI's outstanding risk management, quality control,
continuing education program and general leadership in the
industry have contributed significantly to a drastic reduction in
diver fatalities from forty-five fatalities per 100,000 divers in 1975
to less than fifteen diver fatalities per 100,000 divers in 1993.111
In the 1960's, "[d]iving instruction was haphazard, at best."
1 54
In 1991, John Cronin, CEO of PADI, wrote "[w]e're the most effec-
tive lobbying group in the recreational diving industry, protecting
the interests of diving retailers, instructors and diving consum-
ers.""'5 5He went on to state that his organization's members were
"largely responsible for decreasing the rate of recreational diving
fatalities to its lowest in 25 years."1 56
PADI requires and strictly enforces the use of exculpatory
agreements for all certification levels, specialty courses, and activ-
ities related to PADI sanctioned programs. This, in part, has ena-
bled scuba instructors to carry the required liability insurance
coverage at reasonable rates, which has, in turn, allowed the
insurance industry to show support to store owners and resort
operators.
Thus, in response to the question of whether self-regulation
provides effective protection for the safety of diving participants,
the answer is "yes." Self-regulation appears to be sufficient to
ensure an acceptable level of safety while keeping government
interference and regulation out of the industry.1
57
2. State Regulation
State regulation is another means to assure that adequate
safety precautions are being taken to protect the public. State
regulation usually occurs if one or both of the following conditions
exist: one, society is not comfortable with the safety precautions
imposed by the industry, or two, the industry is not well organ-
152. Jeff Nadler, Truly International, UNDERSEA J., First Quarter, 1996, at 9.
153. PADI Celebrates its 30th Year!, supra note 141, at 7.




157. "When [PADI] control[s] and self-regulate[s] seventy-five percent of the
market share effectively, the government has no reason to interfere." Interview with
Dana Stewart, supra note 146.
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ized, and its attempts to avoid liability has prompted state regula-
tion. The latter condition is further complicated by economic
incentives for the host state. In sports that attract many partici-
pants, the state's economic interests often compel regulation.
State regulation of sports has occurred in several states,"I In
Colorado, for instance, the second condition prompted state legis-
lative action in the skiing industry. The Colorado state legisla-
ture, in its 1990 amendment to the Ski Safety Act of 1979,
expressly stated that "despite the passage of the [act], ski area
operators of this state continue to be subjected to claims and liti-
gation involving accidents which occur during the course of the
sport of snow skiing, which claims and litigation and threat
thereof unnecessarily increase Colorado ski operators' costs."
1 59
The legislature explained that the purpose of the act was to
clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the dangers
and risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter of
law that certain dangers and risks are inherent it that sport,
and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person
engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator for
injuries resulting from those inherent dangers and risks.'6 °
The Colorado Ski Safety Act also limits ski area operators' liabil-
ity by capping damages at one million dollars. 16 The Act and its
158. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 05.45.010 (1995) (Alaska - skiing); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1101 (1994) (Idaho - skiing); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 488 (West 1995) (Maine -
skiing); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 143, § 710 (Law. Co-op. 1996) (Massachusetts - skiing);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18-1234(44) (Callaghan 1994) (Michigan - sport shooting); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 23-2-731 (1995) (Montana - skiing); Id. § 23-2-651 (Montana -
snowmobiling); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 225-A:24 (1994) (New Hampshire - skiing);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-15-2 (Michie 1995) (New Mexico - skiing); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 18-101 (Consol. 1995) (New York - skiing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-09-01 (1995)
(North Dakota - skiing); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.975 (1994) (Oregon - skiing); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(c) (1995) (Pennsylvania - downhill skiing); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-51 (1995) (Utah - skiing); WASH. REV. CODE § 70-117-020 (1995) (Washington
- skiing); W. VA. CODE § 20-3A-1 (1995) (West Virginia - skiing); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-123
(1995) (Wyoming - "any sport or recreational opportunity").
159. Amended Legislative declaration to Ski Safety Act of 1979, COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1 (West 1995). The legislature also declared that large numbers of
residents and nonresidents participated in skiing, "significantly contributing to the
economy of [Colorado]." Id.
160. Id.
161. Ski Safety Act of 1979, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7, 33-44-113 (West 1995).
The total amount of damages which may be recovered from a ski area
operator by a skier . . . who is injured . . . shall not exceed one million
dollars, present value, including any derivative claim by any other
claimant, which shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars,
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revisions clearly define the activity's inherent dangers and risks
assumed by the participant, along with the ski area operators'
duties.'62 The skier assumes the risks due to weather and snow
conditions on the slopes, including those made by snow
machines.163 The skier also assumes risks caused by surface con-
ditions, including "bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps,
streambeds, and trees, or other natural objects."' 64 Under the Col-
orado statute the risk of collisions with these natural objects,
impacts with lift towers, and any other man-made structures is
also assumed by the skier. 165 Each lift ticket sold in Colorado
must also warn the skier of the assumption of risk and what those
risks include' 66
According to the Colorado Ski Safety Act, the ski area opera-
tor's duties are basically two-fold, a duty to warn and a duty to
cover man-made obstructions. The duty to warn includes posting
signs and notices signaling dangerous areas, man-made struc-
tures, and trails "which are not readily visible to skiers under con-
ditions of ordinary visibility from a distance of at least one
hundred feet."1 6 7 It is also the ski area operators' duty to "ade-
quately and appropriately cover such obstructions with a shock-
absorbent material that will lessen injuries."168  Although the
area operators have the right to revoke a person's skiing privileges
for "skiing in a careless and reckless manner," the statute specifi-
cally forbids interpreting that right to mean an "affirmative duty,"
thus absolving them from liability for such claims.'
69
Id. The act allows these figures to be exceeded in limited circumstances. Id.
162. Ski Safety Act of 1979, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2, 33-44-103, § 3, 33-44-107
(West 1995). Skiing, according to Colorado law, encompasses the use of skis, a
toboggan, a sled, a tube, a ski-bob, a snowboard, or any other device for the purpose of




166. Id. at § 3, 33-44-107. The following warning must be on each lift ticket sold
and must also be posted in a clearly visible area where the lift tickets are sold:
Under Colorado law, a skier assumes the risk of any injury to person or
property resulting from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing
and may not recover from any ski area operator for any injury resulting
from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing, including:
Changing weather conditions; existing and changing snow conditions;
bare spots; rocks; stumps; trees; collisions with natural objects, man-
made objects, or other skiers; variations in terrain; and the failure of




169. Id. at § 4, 33-44-108.
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Vermont has also passed legislation regulating certain types
of sports. The applicable Vermont Statute states in pertinent
part, "a person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of
law the dangers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious
and necessary. "170 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the Vermont statute, applying its assump-
tion of the risk effects to a lawsuit brought by one skier against
another. 171 The court, relying on the Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearings, explained that the "legislature by enacting § 1037
sought to appease insurance industry concerns."1 72 This was fur-
ther evident by testimony given before the "State Senate Judiciary
Committee in contemplation of H. 417 - the bill that eventually
became § 1037 - the drafters believed [a recently decided case]
marked a change in Vermont law, the effect of which would be to
subject ski area operators to a significant and undetermined
increase in potential liability."1 73 Following the decision of the
case which prompted the State legislature to act, "the two primary
ski area insurers threatened to withdraw from Vermont during
1978, effectively putting in jeopardy one of the state's major indus-
tries."1 74 Once again, Vermont's economic interests, threatened by
insurance companies, brought forth regulation outlining what
duties ski area operators owed to the participating public.
Bungy jumping 17 provides an example of the first condition-
disorganization within the industry. Bungy jumping became pop-
ular in the early 1990's, resulting in the addition of such attrac-
tions at many amusement parks. In Florida, bungy jumping,
unlike other sports, has been classified as an amusement park
attraction, and thus falls under the jurisdiction of the Florida
Department of Agriculture. 76  In 1992, Florida's Agriculture
Commissioner, Bob Crawford, used his state agency's power to
temporarily close bungy jumping attractions across the state.
77
Some attributed the state's reaction to a fatal bungy jumping acci-
170. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (1994).
171. Dillworth v. Gambardella, 970 F.2d 1113 (2nd Cir. 1992).
172. Id. at 1120.
173. Id. at 1117.
174. Id.
175. Bungy or bungee jumping involves jumping from a height and free falling
toward the ground until an attached elasticized rope stretches to the point of ending
the free fall. Bungy jumping is usually done from atop a crane or bridge.
176. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 5A-1.0001(1) (1994).
177. Joanne Cavanaugh & Lyda Longa, The Thrill is Gone: State Bans Jumps,
SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), July 12, 1992, at IA.
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dent in Michigan. 178 Although no severe accidents or deaths had
been reported in Florida, the ban was ordered because the Agri-
culture Commissioner deemed bungy jumping to be an imminent
danger to the public.1 79 As a result, Florida promulgated an
extensive regulation governing the operation of bungy jumping
facilities. 8 ' This regulation, comprised of forty-six parts, detailed
each aspect of bungy jumping operations including the design,
maintenance, and operation of the amusement device.'' Conse-
quently, many facilities closed, leaving only six facilities offering
bungy jumping in Florida.8 2 Unlike Colorado's Ski Safety Act and
other similar state legislation, Florida's bungy jumping regula-
tions were enacted by a state administrative agency. Is society
really deciding that state regulation is necessary because of inade-
quate industry-imposed safety precautions when a state adminis-
trative agency promulgates the changes?
B. Industry Survival
If exculpatory agreements are not upheld, how do we assure
the survival of these industries? The answer to this question lies
in the insurability of the industry. Will the instructor, outdoor
guide, or store operator be able to acquire liability insurance to
cover injuries resulting from his or her negligence? If the insur-
ance is available, will its costs be prohibitive? Besides the liability
for injuries, another determinative factor is the liability created by
the staggering costs of litigation and the subsequent awarding of
damages. Legal defense costs alone can be prohibitive. Mark
Hruska, a partner at Hruska & Lesser, a law firm specializing in
diving litigation, primarily defending the dive industry, stated,
"the cost of defending a lawsuit can range anywhere between
$20,000 and $600,000."183 Notwithstanding legal fees, judgments
against industry providers may also be excessive. Arguably,
larger industries, such as scuba diving or skiing, can more easily
absorb these costs and pass them on to the consumer. But, with-
out insurance, single or private dive operators, sky diving opera-
178. Id.
179. Id. According to Commissioner Bob Crawford, "[it's just a matter of time
before someone in Florida dies if this practice continues." Id.
180. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 5F-8.025 (1994).
181. Id. The regulation outlines proper materials, engineer certifications,
personnel certifications, operation limits, disclosure requirements, and various other
details. Id.
182. Patty Shillington, Chills and Thrills, MIAMI HERALD, July 30, 1994, at 1G.
183. Mark A. Hruska, Defensive Retailing and Teaching, DEMA (Jan. 19, 1996).
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tors, outfitters, or small stable operators, will inevitably fold
under the pressure of these costs.
What then, determines if an industry is insurable? Steve
Vicencia, President of Vicencia & Buckley Insurance Services,
Inc., which provides insurance for the dive industry, stated that
factors they look at when determining insurability include, acci-
dent and fatality rates, safety records and overall risk manage-
ment employed within the industry."' This opinion was
reiterated by Gloria Nelson, broker for Black/White & Associates,
who stated that insurability "depends on the internal risk man-
agement of the industry."1 8 5 Moreover, she stated that rates were
determined in large part by the losses experienced by the
industry. 186
Black/White & Associates provides insurance to operators of a
variety of outdoor recreational activities including, bicycle tour-
ing, boat rentals, canoeing, fishing, hunting, mountaineering, raft-
ing, snowmobiling and trekking, among others. Both Black/White
and Vicencia & Buckley require that the operators use exculpa-
tory agreements as a prerequisite to insurance coverage.1
8 7
Another factor pertaining to the overall risk management of
an industry is the extent to which the state has limited its liability
exposure.' 8 "Certain state legislatures have enacted legislation to
limit liability of the professional outfitter and guide, and those
[limitations] certainly help the insured[, for instance, snow-mobil-
ing in Montana; equestrian riding in Oregon, Idaho and Colorado,
and all recreational sports in Wisconsin.] In those states [insur-
ance brokers] allow rate credits for the reduced exposure."
8 9
184. Telephone interview with Steve Vicencia, Charter Property Casualty
Underwriter (C.P.C.U.), Vicencia & Buckley Insurance Services, Inc. (Oct. 25, 1995).
185. Telephone interview with Gloria Nelson, Broker, Black/White &
Associates/Insurance Brokers (Oct. 25, 1995).
186. Id.
187. Letter from Gloria Nelson, Broker, Black/White & Associates/Insurance
Brokers, to Mario R. Arango (Oct. 26, 1995) (on file with the authors).
For most classes of business we will require that a client have all
participants or users sign a specific release of liability (ROL). The ROL is
designed to advise the participant of the inherent dangers of the activity
and to let them know that if they choose to (voluntarily) participate, that
they must take on those inherent, often hazardous, risks. We are, after
all, insuring a "guide" who can lead the way but cannot change the course
or nature of avalanches, rivers, horses, etc.
Id.
188. See State Regulation, supra part III.A.2.
189. Letter from Gloria Nelson, Broker, Black/White & Associates Insurance
Brokers, to Mario R. Arango (Oct. 26, 1995) (on file with the authors).
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Here the risk management is apportioned by the state which
assures cost effective rates for the operator. The same results,
however, can be achieved by self-regulation as in the scuba
industry.
Those recreational industries with poor risk management
records are in a precarious position. Saddle sports, for example,
are presently uninsurable. 190 The skydiving industry has also
been uninsurable for the past twelve years.' 91 If insurance was
available, the costs would be so prohibitive that the whole exercise
would be impracticable.' 92 According to the late Thomas D. Man-
ning, President and Chief Instructor at Sky-Dive Miami, Inc., the
impracticality of insuring the skydiving industry has been due to
poor risk management by the American Parachuting Associa-
tion.193 Most air sports, like hang-gliding and parasailing, how-
ever, face a similar predicament.194 To protect themselves against
liability, Sky-Dive Miami requires a prospective student to sign an
"assumption of the risk," "exemption of liability" and "covenant
not to sue" after the student has viewed a video detailing the
inherent risks associated with skydiving. 195 Additionally, the pro-
spective student must sign an "Experimental Test Parachute
Jumper Agreement," which requires that the student initial
nineteen specific paragraphs detailing the waiver of risk, affirma-
tions, and disclosures the student is agreeing to. 196 These excul-
patory agreements serve as the only defense against potential
liability and offer Sky-Dive Miami the only chance of remaining in
business. In support of such a protective posture, the Buchan
court reasoned that,
[iun cases arising from hazardous recreational pursuits, to
permit released claims to be brought to trial defeats the pur-
pose for which releases are requested and given, regardless
of which party ultimately wins the verdict. Defense costs are
devastating. Unless courts are willing to dismiss such
190. Interview with Gloria Nelson, Broker, Black/White & Associates/Insurance
Brokers (Oct. 25, 1995).
191. Interview with the late Thomas D. Manning, President of Sky-dive Miami,
Inc. (Oct. 24, 1995) (Thomas D. Manning died on May 25, 1997, in a tragic airplane




195. Id. The video presents the risks involved in skydiving including a dramatic
reenactment of a parachuting accident which drives home the ultimate risk involved
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actions without trial, many popular and lawful recreational
activities are destined for extinction. 
197
C. Who Absorbs the Cost?
Superficially, the personal responsibility model advocated by
the exculpatory agreement assumes that the person engaged in
the activity bears the burdens created when he or she is injured.
The very nature of human behavior informs a deeper analysis.
Consequences resulting from an injury or death usually affect
those closest to the participant. If a married participant is injured
or dies, then the potential damages to the surviving spouse may
include loss of consortium and loss of supporting wages. If minor
children are present, the problem may be aggravated.1 9 8 If the
participant is maimed or seriously incapacitated, the problems
become even more complex because the losses are two fold: first,
the losses mentioned above may be present; and second, the par-
ticipant herself may become a further burden if additional atten-
tion is required for her care. Even in the case of an unmarried
participant, the loss of income or ability to work can produce
extreme burdens. The question then becomes, who absorbs those
burdens?
While it may be true that the majority of participants
involved in these activities have some form of health and/or life
insurance, these coverages do not adequately cover damages that
include pain and suffering, loss of earning potential, loss of
income, or loss of consortium. Most individuals do not or cannot
insure against these types of losses. The answer to the question is
that society absorbs these burdens. Specifically, a combination of
private (i.e. friends and family) and public (i.e. the welfare system)
assistance shoulders the weight. If society is carrying the burden,
then what alternatives exist?
Some have suggested that self insurance may be a viable
option. However, unless the sport commands a significant
197. Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 3d 134, 147 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (citing National & Int'l Bhd. of St. Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 215
Cal. App. 3d 934 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)) (emphasis added).
198. The problem becomes aggravated not only because of direct economic
multipliers, i.e. more children means more liability, but also because of indirect
consequences. Loss of a spouse may mean the surviving spouse must spend more
hours away from child rearing responsibilities in order to make up for the loss of the
decedent's income. This situation has other ramifications including, cost of additional
child care, cost to the children's well being, cost to society if child care is not accessible
or affordable, and the potential loss of proper parental support and guidance.
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number of participants, the implementation of such a scheme
would be cost prohibitive.' 99 There are three basic alternatives to
self-insurance: (1) the Cash Flow Model, (2) the Captive Insurance
Model, and (3) the End User Model.2 °°
The Cash Flow Model in its basic form allows for losses to be
paid directly from the provider's operating capital. This model is
highly risky and requires that each operator maintain a substan-
tial reserve. This would necessarily imply that the operator be
highly successful so that in the event of a loss or multiple losses,
he would have the ability to satisfy whatever claims may result.
Although this may be feasible in areas where the risk is relatively
low, it would be impractical in sports where the risk of injury is
high. Realistically, a small operator could not meet this burden.
In some instances, the operator establishes a corporation with
minimal assets, thus limiting their exposure in the event of a
large claim. However, the end result is that the operator goes out
of business.
The Captive Insurance Model operates by way of a created
company which handles the operation of an insurance fund. This
fund is capitalized by its members, (the operators involved). The
advantages with this model are two part: first, the burdens of risk
are spread over several members rather than a single operator;
and second, the insurance fund is "re-insurable," meaning that an
insurance policy may be obtained to cover the inadequacies of the
capitalized insurance fund.
Finally, the End User Model creates a fund whereby each par-
ticipant pays a premium to cover the risk of injury to themselves.
All claims for damages are satisfied by use of this fund: The main
disadvantage is administrative in nature. How does one ensure
that all of the members are paying proportionately into the fund?
How does one coordinate an industry wide effort?
In all models, the number of participants is critical in deter-
mining the feasibility of capitalizing such funds. Sports with
fewer participants would be prohibited from self-insuring because
of the high capitalization costs. Consequently, they would find
themselves in the same position that they are in today: where an
exculpatory agreement is the only barrier that stands between
199. This insurance analysis is cursory at best. We do not intend for it to be an
in-depth analysis on the level of insurability of any particular sport; we leave that to
the actuary. Instead, we put forth what has occurred to date and possible answers to
why self-insurance is difficult,
200. Telephone interview with Steve Vicencia, Charter Property Casualty
Underwriter (C.P.C.U.), Vicencia & Buckley Insurance Services, Inc. (Mar. 8, 1996).
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their survival and their extinction. Also critical to insurability are
what type of injuries occur, how often injuries occur, and how
much these injuries typically cost. As previously discussed, the
legal defense costs can also be prohibitive.
D. Determination of Validity of Exculpatory Agreement
At some point, two important questions must be contemplated
in relation to upholding the validity of exculpatory agreements.
Should their validity depend on the type of sporting activity? And,
when does a sporting activity cross the threshold of public inter-
est, i.e. when do the burdens produced by participation outweigh
the benefits reaped by society in general and by the participant in
particular? This latter question is distinct from the initial public
policy question discussed previously, in that the courts there
examined whether the activity should initially fall within the pur-
view of classic public interest, such as hospital care, banking, com-
mon carriers. Here, once the determination is made that the
activity does not initially fall within that classification, the ques-
tions then become twofold: Is there a point at which the activity
does become a public policy consideration? If yes, how is that
threshold point determined? Finally, even if an activity is deemed
to have crossed the public policy threshold, should it make a
difference?
1. Should Validity Depend On Sporting Activity?
There are many differences among the various sporting activi-
ties. There are tangible differences: team versus individual par-
ticipation, equipment required to participate, training required,
environmental challenges, and proximity and availability of sup-
port services. There are also intangible considerations: social
benefits, (e.g. promotion of health, aversion of aggressive tenden-
cies, promotion of social camaraderie, promotion of family unity
and diversion, promotion of self-confidence); economic benefits,
(e.g. creation of industries and all its ramifications); likelihood of
death or serious injury; numbers of participants; socio-economic
level of participants; availability of education and training; and
guidance or supervision required prior to and during
participation.
In evaluating whether an exculpatory agreement should be
upheld when applied to a particular sport, one can become hope-
lessly bogged down in a quagmire of confusion if one concentrates
on all the subtle differences that exist between different sports.
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For instance, baseball, soccer, and basketball do not involve the
same degree of contact as football. With greater contact, the pos-
sibility of injury increases, and consequently the burdens result-
ing from those injuries. Does that mean that we should uphold
exculpatory agreements for participation in football, yet make
them invalid for participation in baseball, soccer or basketball; or,
from a burden analysis, should they be upheld for baseball, soccer,
and basketball? Since football carries a greater probability of
injury, should we then invalidate the exculpatory agreement for
football, yet allow it in the case of baseball, soccer or basketball?
The 1994 National Safety Council Statistics for the Occurrence of
Injuries in Various Sports reflect a 3.31 percent accident incident
rate for football, as opposed to a 1.39 percent for baseball, a 2.67
rate for basketball and a 1.51 percent rate for soccer.2 ° ' When the
people participating in these sports are taken into account, 20 2 it is
evident that the difference in incidents rates are insignificant
regardless of the inherent differences among these sports. Com-
pare this to scuba diving, a "high risk" sport, where the incident
rate was 0.04 percent.20 3
When considering the higher risk sports, should the depen-
dency on equipment or the dependency on proper instruction
make a difference? Compared to traditional team sports, partici-
pation in scuba diving, sky diving, hang gliding, and skiing are all
highly dependent on equipment. The failure of a regulator or
gauge while scuba diving, a parachute failing to open during free
fall, a strut giving way while hang gliding, or a defect in the skis
while descending downhill, could all result in serious injury or
death. Similarly, failure to be given proper instruction in all these
areas could, and probably would, have the same results. However,
the participant must understand and accept the possibility that
the equipment on which they depend may fail at any given
moment. It is one of the risks inherent in the sport. Although the
exculpatory agreement would absolve the provider from liability
for negligence, it would not be upheld in the product liability con-
201. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 92 (1994).
202. Participants in: football - 13.5 million, baseball and softball - 34.3 million,
soccer -10.6 million, basketball - 28.2 million. Id.
203. Drew Richardson, An Assessment of Risk for Recreational Dive Instructors
at Work, UNDERSEA J., Second Quarter, 1995, at 15 (basing statistical data on
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1991)). Based on 1991 figures where
1044 injuries were reported out of 2.6 million participants. Id. 1994 rates were not
available. "Higher risk" sports generally are activities in which there is a higher
probability of serious injury or death.
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text. A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of defective equip-
ment will still be liable regardless of the exculpatory clause.
Where instruction is concerned, unless it is conducted on a
one-to-one basis, which often makes the cost prohibitive to many
potential participants, there is always a possibility of a situation
arising while the instructor's attention is diverted to another stu-
dent. Although procedures can be, and are, established to reduce
or control this risk, they can never be completely eliminated. Yet,
it would it be unreasonable to hold exculpatory agreements valid
only in one-on-one instructional situations and invalid where
there is more than one student. Where instruction is necessary,
but a participant decides to forgo that instruction, an exculpatory
agreement would typically not be involved anyway. Only where
the provider (e.g., a dive boat operator) is aware of a participant's
limitations (e.g., certification level), and nonetheless, allows that
participant to engage in the type of activity that they know is
beyond that participant's skill level, could an argument be made
for not upholding the release. However, in this situation, the pro-
vider's actions should be considered grossly negligent and should
demonstrate a wanton and willful disregard for the participant's
health and safety and thus, should not be protected by the release
in the first place.
What about environmental challenges? Stormy conditions
are no less dangerous to a scuba diver than the same high winds
and poor visibility would be to a hang glider or parachutist, or
black ice and poor visibility to a skier. Poor environmental condi-
tions would create unacceptable risks to the participants of any
sport. If a provider chooses to ignore these conditions when pro-
viding a service, then that provider's action should also fall into
the same wanton and willful disregard for health and safety
classification.
Given the unique differences between each sport, a uniform
test cannot be developed that would generally apply; therefore,
the threshold determination needs to be, and can only be, the vol-
untariness of the individual's participation. If the participant vol-
untarily chooses to engage in these activities, that person must
understand the potential risks, accept those risks, accept respon-
sibility for the choices he or she makes, and for the injuries that
may result from those choices.
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2. When Does an Activity Become a Public Policy Issue?
As previously discussed, the courts have relied heavily on the
six factors brought out in Tunkl. Although the Tunkl factors seem
to be the generally accepted criteria for such determination, very
little analysis has been developed regarding application of those
factors. Through 1995, one of the most in-depth arguments deliv-
ered came from the dissenting opinion of Judge Johnson in the
Buchan case.20 4 The plaintiff, a full-time athlete competing for a
position on the United States Olympic Team, was severely injured
while competing in a qualifying bicycle race. In his discussion,
Judge Johnson explains that in determining the validity of an
exculpatory agreement, the focus should be on the factors upon
which the Tunkl court relied, namely: "(1) Is the party seeking
exculpation engaged in a service of great importance to the public?
(2) Does providing this service give the provider a decisive advan-
tage in bargaining strength over a person using this service?"
20 5
The Judge's analysis focused on interpreting the preceding
questions.
a. Is the Party Seeking Exculpation Engaged in a Service of
Great Importance to the Public?
Judge Johnson's dissent claims that the situation in Buchan
falls under the purview of public interest.2"6 Although he concedes
that most sports do not meet the public interest threshold, Judge
Johnson believes that the factual circumstances surrounding Ms.
Buchan's participation does.20 7 Specifically, he cited the final
report of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports, which
concluded, "[tihe fact is that we are competing less well and other
nations competing more successfully because other nations have
established excellence in international athletics as a national pri-
ority."20 Relying on San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United
States Olympic Committee,209 Judge Johnson maintains that the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, which created the United States
Olympic Committee, established a public interest because "Con-
204. Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 3d 134, 155 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991).
205. Id. at 161 (citing Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446-47
(Cal. 1963)).
206. Id. at 155-65.
207. Id. at 162.
208. Id. (quoting 1 Final report of the Pres. Comm. on Olympic Sports 1975-1977
p. ix (1977)).
209. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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gress has a [broad] public interest in promoting.., the participa-
tion of amateur athletes from the United States in [the Olympic
Games] ."210 He reinforced his argument that such activities fall
under the public interest by quoting the purpose and goals of the
United States Olympic Committee.21 ' In particular, the
U.S.O.C.'s
objects and purposes [should] be to (1) establish national
goals for amateur athletic activities and encourage the
attainment of those goals; (2) coordinate and develop ama-
teur athletic activity in the United States directly relating to
international amateur athletic competition, so as to foster
productive working relationships among sports-related orga-
nizations; (3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly
or through its constituent members or committees, over all
matters pertaining to the participation of the United States
212
This coupled with the U.S.O.C.'s sanctioning of amateur athletic
competitions nationwide convinced Judge Johnson that the sport
of bicycle racing as practiced in the Buchan case was "a matter of
great importance to the public."213
b. Does the Provider have a Decisive Advantage in Bargaining
Strength Over the Participant?
Critically important to Judge Johnson's findings were the
existing regulations. Unlike a participant who rides in an "open
to the public event," the race in Buchan required that participants
reach a certain level of training after which a license was issued
allowing the person to race. 214 Furthermore, the sole governing
body, the United States Cycling Federation, Inc. (USCF), had a
duty to ensure safety precautions were taken to protect the par-
ticipants.215 That duty was breached when the USCF allowed a
novice to race with the more experienced licensed bicyclists, par-
ticularly when many elite racers, including Ms. Buchan, had noti-
fied race organizers about the novice's behavior in the previous
210. Id. at 162-63 (quoting San Fran. & Athletics v. U.S.O.C., 483 U.S. 522, 537
(1987)).
211. Id. at 163.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 157, 162.
215. Id. at 156. "The act imposes duties upon the Federation as the sole national
governing body of Olympic amateur racing including the duty of ensuring safety
precautions are taken to protect the athletes." Id.
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race.2 16 Consequently, Judge Johnson argued that the exculpa-
tory agreement signed by Ms. Buchan should be invalid as against
public policy.21
Although Judge Johnson's dissent identified a potential
exception to the general rule that voluntary participation in sport-
ing activities is not a matter of public policy, it is a very narrow
application. Furthermore, what was the public interest or pur-
pose in passing the Amateur Sports Act? If the purpose was to
add incentive for potential amateur athletic participation, then
holding exculpatory agreements invalid within the realm of such
activities is, at best, a weak proposition. Most likely, a person
wishing to compete in the Olympics will do so, regardless of her
liability for potential injuries. Even in light of the dissent's deter-
mination, does it make sense to ignore the assumption of the risk
analysis? Although an Olympic hopeful is an amateur partici-
pant, she is a highly skilled participant, and therefore has a
greater appreciation than a novice participant for the risks
involved. This was the basic analysis applied in both Heil Valley
and Snowmass, which led those courts to opposite outcomes.
Recall in Heil Valley that the exculpatory agreement was upheld
due to the experience of the horseback rider on the premise that
she should have understood the risks involved. Compare this to
Snow Mass, in which, under the same analysis, because of the
participant's lack of experience, she could not have had the requi-
site understanding to assume the risks involved. Does it make
sense to make the novice assume the inherent risks of the sport
while allowing the more experienced participant to escape the
same assumption of the risk? The Buchan majority thought not:
Logic and common sense dictate that if releases are to be
voided as a matter of public policy based on the skill level
and dreams of participants, then the law should protect
inexperienced participants as opposed to elite, experienced
riders who are fully aware of and knowingly and voluntarily
accept the risks inherent in participating in the sport.21 '
Another threshold factor involved in the public policy issue as
it relates to sports seems to be the number of participants
involved. The Banfield court alluded to this when it stated that
[i]t seems that society, today, may be more aware than ever
of the importance and fun of exercise. Yet, an infinitely
216. Id. at 159.
217. Id. at 160-65.
218. Id. at 154.
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small percentage of the public appear to participate pres-
ently in triathlon races. At some future date, when cultural
changes produce Monday Night Triathlon, this court may
well find itself hard pressed not to conclude exculpatory
clauses signed by triathlon participants void as a matter of
public policy.219
What then is this magic public policy number? The 1994 National
Security Council Accident Statistics showed that 63.1 million peo-
ple participated in swimming that year, 42.5 million participated
in bowling, 26.5 million in roller skating, 22.1 million in volley-
ball, and 17.3 million in tennis.220 These sports had accident inci-
dent rates of 0.19 percent, 0.06 percent, 0.51 percent, 0.62 percent,
and 0.18 percent, respectively.22' Yet, none of these sports have
been classified as activities falling within the realm of public pol-
icy. Society has determined that the number of injuries involved
has not created a sufficient burden to warrant invalidating excul-
patory agreements. However, it stands to reason that with
increased participation in these sports, more injuries will occur.
As the number of injuries increases so do the costs to society. At
some point in the future, a sport may become so popular that the
state may deem that activity within the realm of public policy.
But should this matter?
3. Should an Activity's Classification as a Public
Interest Matter?
Although the potential consequences resulting from the
Buchan court's dissent which designated Olympic qualification
events within the realm of public policy, are unclear, what is evi-
dent is that the reasoning of the majority opinion was flawed.
Rather than relying upon a public policy analysis, the court
should have based its opinion on the doctrine of gross negli-
gence.222 The USCF had previously been put on notice as to the
danger that the novice cyclist, Ms. Mary Pieper, presented to the
rest of the participants.22 3 Six days prior to the race in which the
plaintiff in Buchan was injured, Pieper's actions had caused a
219. Banfield v. Louis, 589 So. 2d 441, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
220. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 92 (1994). Compare this to
scuba diving, which had a mere 2.6 million people engaged in the activity.
Richardson, supra note 203 at 15.
221. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 92 (1994).
222. Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 3d 134, 137 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991).
223. Id. at 159.
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group of riders to fall.224 "Although that day there were no serious
injuries, a number of the cyclists, the Buchan plaintiff among
them, approached the president and other officials of [the USCF]
present at the race site and complained vigorously that Pieper did
not belong in the World Trials and was a danger to the competi-
tors."225 Furthermore, "[oln the morning of the ... race, the com-
plaints about Mary Pieper's presence in the race were renewed
and again ignored."226 Although the court did not address the
argument, the officials' decision to ignore the complaints lodged by
these experienced participants should have been deemed a willful
or reckless disregard for the health and safety of the other compet-
itors. As such, USCF should have been held accountable for their
decision based on a gross negligence standard, thus overcoming
the exculpatory agreement barrier.227 Of particular importance is
the dissent's finding that "[in an Olympic-level race, the elite rac-
ers know each other, rely upon each other's experience and know
what to do and what not to do in tight, pressure situations."228 In
the first race, the accident occurred as the competitors "sped
downhill reaching a speed of 30 miles per hour."2 29 Ms. Pieper
was weaving in and out of the pack when her front wheel hit the
rider in front of her causing the pack to fall.230 The same thing
occurred in the second race after the pack had reached a speed of
approximately 50 miles per hour.231 Here, it was reasonably fore-
seeable that Ms. Pieper's continued participation would result in
serious injury.
Notwithstanding the contention that the decision was
wrongly decided, under the Tunkl factors, a strong argument
exists to hold Olympic trials within the realm of public policy.
232
The majority in Buchan relied on the Okura v. United States
Cycling Federation, another California appellate decision, which
held that "[t]here is no compelling public interest in facilitating
224. Id. at 158-59.
225. Id. at 159.
226. Id.
227. When signing an exculpatory agreement, a person is waiving her right to
sue for the provider's negligence. It is not a general waiver of all legal recourse.
Agreements that purport to release the provider for gross negligence or intentional
actions potentially violate the equal protection clause of many state constitutions and
the United States Constitution. See Brewer v. Ski-Lift, Inc., 762 P.2d 226 (Mont.
1988).
228. Buchan, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 158 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 159. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
232. See Buchan, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 155 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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sponsorship and organization of the leisure activity of bicycle rac-
ing for public participation.... The service certainly cannot be
termed one that 'is often a matter of practical necessity for some
members of the public."'233 Moreover, when the Buchan plaintiff
attempted to distinguish her situation because of her need to par-
ticipate in the competition to qualify for the Olympic team, the
court still found that her goal of reaching the Olympics
is commendable but that does not make bicycle racing a mat-
ter of great public importance or turn participation in such a
race into a practical necessity for anyone. No matter how
important it is to any individual, bicycle racing does not rise
to the level of public importance as that of hospitals and hos-
pitalization, escrow transactions, banking transactions, and
common carriers.234
The court implied that, even if the ultimate goal was the Olym-
pics, the voluntary nature of participation in such events would
exempt it from the category of necessity, and therefore, from the
category of public policy.
Similarly, in the ski industry cases, a strong argument can be
made for the classification of the sport as a public interest. Uni-
form state regulation throughout the ski industry falls squarely
within the parameters of the first Tunkl factor which states that
the "agreement concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation."235 As shown previously, most, if
not all states in which downhill skiing exists have passed laws
which regulate the industry, and thus skiing falls within the "gen-
erally thought suitable for public regulation" language of Tunkl.
These regulations outline participant's duties, provider's duties,
the inherent risks of the sport, and who will be liable for what.
Moreover, many of the statutes explain that the purpose for
having passed the regulation was to protect the strong economic
benefits reaped by the state.236 It can hardly be argued that this
overriding economic interest as evidenced by the language of the
statutes does not qualify as a public interest. By its very defini-
tion, a public interest is "[s] omething in which the public, the com-
munity at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by
233. Id. at 151 (quoting Okura v. United States Cycling Fed'n, 186 Cal. App. 3d
1462, 1467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)) (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 151.
235. See supra note 55.
236. These benefits are ultimately reaped by the citizens of that state through
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which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."237 In these
states which have enacted regulations, the community at large,
through its political process, has voiced its pecuniary interest in
perpetuating the ski industry. The regulations express the legis-
lature's intent to protect the provider, thus ensuring their contin-
ued existence. Although the economic interests involved in sports
may pale in comparison to those of banking, when a state legisla-
ture decides to regulate an industry it considers of economic con-
sequence, it is, in effect, finding some significant level of necessity
to its existence. The question then becomes, when does that level
of necessity cross the threshold of public interest? Arguably, the
moment the state decides to regulate, the object of that regulation
has crossed the threshold of public interest. Still, the courts have
not been willing to accept this argument in relation to sports
because of the voluntary nature of participation. Participation is
based on an individual's desire to get involved. The same cannot
be said of banking.
Finally, an exculpatory agreement can be considered a form of
adhesion contract. Although participation is voluntary, industry
practices dictate that the participant accept the agreement on a
"take it or leave it basis." This condition exists regardless of how
many operators the participant approaches. It creates an unfair
bargaining advantage as outlined in Tunkl's fourth factor, that
"the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of
bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks
the party's services."23 Yet again, the courts have disregarded
this argument within the context of sports because the activity is
not deemed to be "essential," implying the voluntary nature of
participation.
What the above scenarios suggest is that Tunkl, as applied to
sports, is dead, and should not be used as a measuring stick to
determine when a sport falls within the purview of public policy.
This view is supported by the majority in Buchan, which, in reli-
ance on the Madison case, stated "that the concept of 'public inter-
est' has no applicability to sports activities."239
However, even in the unlikely event that at some future date
sports become classified as a public policy interest, it should not
matter where an exculpatory agreement is concerned. When soci-
237. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990).
238. See supra note 55.
239. Buchan, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 149 (relying on Madison v. Superior Court, 203
Cal. App. 3d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).
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ety, through the political process, determines that the particular
activity falls within the "public interest," what has changed in the
analysis? The voluntary nature of the participation is not
affected. The inherent risks involved in the sport are not dimin-
ished. The likelihood of injury is not lessened. The real change is
in who is bearing the burden for losses. Specifically, the burden
for losses is shifted from participant to provider. The conse-
quences of shifting this burden to the provider will likely result in
either prohibitive costs to participate in the activity, or extinction
of the activity. Note, however, that this shifting of the burden, at
best, mitigates the costs to society, (assuming the participant is
awarded damages), but, by no means, does it eliminate such costs.
Although this analysis may not apply well to traditional sports
such as basketball, baseball and football, the shifting of the bur-
den to the provider would have a devastating effect on the higher
risk sports such as auto racing, scuba, skydiving, and hang-glid-
ing, where the insurance companies require the use of exculpatory
agreements as a prerequisite to coverage.
E. Minor Participation
Minors present a unique legal problem in respect to recrea-
tional sports industries, especially high risk sports. The predomi-
nant case law indicates that exculpatory agreements cannot serve
as a complete bar against liability where minors are concerned.
In Childress v. Madison County,240 a Tennessee court con-
cluded that the release signed by the mother of a mentally
retarded student was effective to release the defendant from lia-
bility to the mother, but did not waive the rights of the student.241
William Todd Childress was a twenty-year-old severely-retarded
student, participating in training for the Special Olympics. 242 The
training was being conducted at a YMCA swimming pool and
three adults present were charged with the responsibility of
supervising the students.24 3 At some point Childress slipped into
the deep end of the pool and went unnoticed for an undetermined
amount of time before being pulled out and revived by the life-
guard.244 He suffered injuries, requiring significant medical
expenses. 245 The mother had signed a release absolving the par-
240. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
241. Id. at 8.
242. Id. at 2.
243. Id. at 3.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2.
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ties from all liability.246 The court reasoned that there "were good
and logical reasons for giving effect to exculpatory agreements
executed by parents on behalf of infants and incompetents."247
The court stated that,
[r]isk is inherent in many activities that make the lives of
children richer. A world without risk would be an impover-
ished world indeed. As Helen Keller well said, "security is
mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the
children of men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is
no safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is
either a daring adventure or nothing." Ultimately, this case
is a determination of who must bear the burden of the risk of
injury to infants and minors.
248
However, the court concluded that "[t]he law [was] clear that
a guardian cannot on behalf of an infant or incompetent, exculpate
or indemnify against liability those organizations which sponsor
activities for children and the mentally disabled."249 Therefore,
the court held that "Mrs. Childress could not execute a valid
release or exculpatory clause as to the rights of her son against
the Special Olympics or anyone else, and to the extent the parties
to the release attempted and intended to do so, the release is
void."250
In reaching their holding, the Tennessee court reviewed the
court decisions of a number of other states. The first was the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court ruling in Khoury v. Saik,251 which held
that "[minors can waive nothing. In the law they are helpless, so
much so that their representatives can waive nothing for
them."252 The second was a ruling of the Connecticut Supreme
Court, which held that a release signed by a minor's parents
"waiving the minor's claims against a camp for damages in the
event of an injury was ineffective to waive the rights of the minor
against the defendant camp."253 The third was a Maine Supreme
Court ruling which held that "if the agreement in question were a
release, it would be ineffective because a parent cannot release the
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id. at 7.
248. Id.
249. Id. 7-8.
250. Id. at 7.
251. 33 So.2d 616 (Miss. 1968).
252. Id. (citing Khouy, 33 So.2d at 618).
253. Id. (citing Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 143 A.2d
466, 468 (Conn. 1958)).
[Vol. 14:1
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child's action."254 More recent decisions reviewed by the Tennes-
see court included cases from Colorado, Vermont and New
Jersey.255
In the landmark case, Scott v. Pacific Mountain Resort,256 a
twelve-year-old ski student sustained severe head injuries while
skiing at a commercial ski resort.2 7 His mother had signed a
release absolving the resort and the ski school of any liability.
258
His mother further indicated that her son was an advanced
skier.259 In evaluating the release, the court noted that "it is set-
tled law in many jurisdictions that, absent judicial or statutory
authority, parents have no authority to release a cause of action
belonging to their child."260 The court reasoned that, "[i]n situa-
tions where parents are unwilling or unable to provide for a seri-
ously injured child, the child would have no recourse against a
negligent party to acquire resources needed for care and this is
true regardless of when relinquishment of the child's rights might
occur."261 Consequently, after finding that the language of the
release was conspicuously clear and unambiguous, the court held
that the parents' cause of action was barred, but not that of the
child.262
In light of these decisions, the dive operator, instructor, etc.
must now decide whether he or she is willing to assume the risk in
the event of injury. Various industries have approached this
dilemma in different ways. The parachute industry, for example,
has excluded minor participation altogether. The same holds true
for many other airborne sports, such as hang-gliding and parasail-
ing. The scuba industry, while allowing the minor to participate
at some advanced certification levels, has imposed depth limits for
instructional dives and has placed restrictions on "junior" certifi-
cations. 263 Some dive operators have prohibited minors from par-
254. Id. (citing Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979)).
255. See id. at 7 ("Jones v. Dressel, (ratification by parent of contract executed by
child does not bind child); Whitcomb v. Dancer, (guardian cannot settle personal
injury claim for ward without court approval); . . .Colfer v. Royal Globe Ins. Co.,
[same Whitcomb v. Dancers]." Id. (citations omitted)).
256. 34 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 8.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 11.
261. Id. at 12.
262. Id. at 16.
263. PADI, OPEN WATER DIVER COURSE INSTRUCTOR GUIDE 1-6 (1993).
Certification is open to students under the age of 15 through the PADI
Junior Open Water Diver Certification.
19971
47
Arango and Trueba: The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory Agreements Under Pressure
Published by Institutional Repository, 1997
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
ticipating on deeper dives. Additionally, the ski industry has
limited certain minors to specific slopes.
Recreational sport industries are faced with a difficult
dilemma. Are minors to be excluded from activities that can pro-
vide such positive, rich and fulfilling experiences in their lives? "It
can be especially beneficial during the sometimes difficult teen
years - fostering independence, trust, responsibility, self-confi-
dence [and an] appreciation of nature."264 Are we to stifle their
natural curiosity to learn new things, and what effect will this
potential "chill" have on such an important aspect of their sociali-
zation? The defendants in the Scott case argued "that the invali-
dation of releases signed by parents to bar child's claims would
make sports engaged in by minors prohibitively expensive due to
insurance costs. "265
Notwithstanding the courts' unwillingness to uphold exculpa-
tory clauses regarding a minor's rights, operators are reluctant to
ignore the economic clout that the youth market possesses.
"[TIeenagers have money to spend and constantly search for new
experiences. Teenagers constitute a group with few financial
responsibilities, high disposable income and remarkable buying
power. Last year, 28 million teens in the U.S. spent more than 99
billion dollars, two thirds of which was their own money."266 Ulti-
mately, the decision to include or exclude minors must rest with
the individual sports providers.
A Junior Open Water Diver is required to meet all requirements for
Open Water Diver certification other than age. The Junior Open Water
Diver is required to be 12 years old prior to the start date of the
course....
A Junior Open Water Diver is qualified to dive only when
accompanied by another certified diver who is of legal age. Legal age is
defined as an individual who is at least 18 years of age - unless a law in
the area defines an older age; in this case the law becomes the guideline.
Id.
PADI, ADVANCED OPEN WATER DRWER PROGRAM INSTRUCTOR GUIDE (1991). Generally,
to qualify for the Advanced Open Water training, an individual must have a PADI
Open Water Diver certification or some equivalent rating, and must be at least fif-
teen-years-old. Id. at 1-10. However, since 1993, PADI has allowed Junior Open
Water Divers to enroll in their advanced program. PADI, TRAINING BULLETIN/UPDATE
1 (Third Quarter, 1993). According to PADI, "[aill course requirements are the same.
However, the depth limit for the deep dive must be limited to a maximum of 70 feet
(21 meters) for the junior diver." Id.
264. Linda Lee Walden, The Transition from Junior to Adult Diver, DIVE
TRAINING, Dec. 1995, at 53.
265. Scott, 34 P.2d at 12.
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For small operators and independent instructors, this deci-
sion will require serious consideration. The legal costs of defend-
ing a cause of action is not diminished due to the age of the parties
and, depending on the jury, the awards may actually be greater in
some instances.26 7 The Scott court stated that "[t]here are
instances where public policy reasons for preserving an obligation
of care owed by one person to another outweigh our traditional
regard for freedom of contract. '26" The defendant countered that,
because under Washington law a parent was allowed to sue on the
part of the minor, the parent should be allowed to release a cause
of action as well.269
Although the Scott court ultimately rejected this argument on
the basis of settled precedent, this reasoning should be further
examined in relation to teenage participation in these sports. Per-
haps the bar imposed on minor's ability to contract should be
lifted so that those over sixteen years of age may, with the consent
of their parents, participate in potentially enriching experiences.
This will settle the dilemma that operators face when confronted
with teenagers who know the risks involved, are willing to assume
them, and have parental approval to do so. Analogous to the
plight of the sixteen-year-old scuba diver, is that of the sixteen-
year-old automobile driver. Although the circumstances may be
different, it would be a difficult task to find a sixteen-year-old who
was not eager to obtain her driver's license. Like the scuba diver,
that teenager is aware of the risks, is willing to assume them, and
probably has parental approval. The minor's signing the applica-
tion for a license is an implied contract whereby the driver
promises to obey "the rules of the road" in exchange for the issu-
ance of the license. While implicitly assuming the responsibilities
involved, she concurrently assumes the risks associated with
those responsibilities. While it may be true that the teenager is
insured - and possibly under her parents' coverage - that teenager
is ultimately responsible for her own choices, whether that deci-
sion is to drive under the influence or pick up a hitchhiker.
V. CONCLUSION
Exculpatory agreements continue to be upheld in the context
of recreational sports. At some point, a person must be held
responsible for the choices that person makes, especially when the
267.
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choice is a voluntary one. Because of the unique characteristics of
each activity, no uniform test exists which can be used to deter-
mine whether to uphold an exculpatory agreement. If a determi-
nation must be made, then, in the context of sports, the standard
for gross negligence should be lowered, so as to exculpate provid-
ers for simple negligence, but hold the provider liable for its
grossly negligent acts. In determining the threshold for negli-
gence or gross negligence, the courts should look at the minimum
standard of care established by the particular industry or, in the
case of state regulation, by the state. The courts can then take
into consideration the unique aspects of the particular sport and
determine, within the context of that sport, if the actions of the
provider were negligent or grossly negligent. Recall the example
given previously, where a dive boat operator knowingly allows a
participant to engage in an activity beyond the participant's expe-
rience level and that decision results in the injury or death of that
participant. The courts should determine this act to be grossly
negligent, and therefore, the act should fall outside of the protec-
tion afforded by the exculpatory agreement. Compare this to a sit-
uation in which a scuba instructor is teaching six students, and
when his attention is diverted while assisting one student, an
injury results to another student. This scenario should fall under
the rubric of simple negligence, and therefore, should be covered
by the exculpatory agreement. Again, recall the facts of the
Buchan case, where the USCF was put on notice of the imminent
danger posed by a novice cyclist in an Olympic trial. The USCF's
decision to ignore the warnings made by the experienced cyclist
should have constituted gross negligence, and therefore, the
USCF should not have been extended the protection offered by the
exculpatory agreement. By lowering the gross negligence thresh-
old, however, a compromise can be achieved between the cases
that should be covered by exculpatory agreements and those that
should have been outside the protection of exculpatory
agreements.
Society will ultimately have to absorb some of the costs
involved in sporting accidents. The question that needs to be
answered is, does this burden outweigh the individual's freedom
to pursue, on a recreational basis, the sports they desire to become
involved with? The authors propose that the only possible answer
to this question, at least in our society, is that the burden to soci-
ety will never outweigh this freedom. It is ingrained in the Ameri-
can psyche and in all persons that
[Vol. 14:1
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[a] venturesome minority will always be eager to get out on
their own, and no obstacles should be placed in their path:
Let them take risks for Godsake, let them get lost, sunburnt,
stranded, eaten by bears, buried alive under avalanches -
that is the right and privilege of any free American.2 7 °
270. In the Matter of Gary Gentile, No. 951-193, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Office of the AIM (Nov. 1989) (quoting
James Huffman, Wilderness and Freedom, 16 IDAHo L. REv. 407, 420 (1980)).
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AND EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF RISK
2t Enuior Rwid O0 Surm A, CA WU14UM USA M 131 W2 * (14)54000
Please read carefully, fill In all blanks and initial each paragraph before signing.
1, 1 hereby affirm that I have been advised and thoroughly Informed
of the inherent hazards of skin diving and scuba diving.
_____ Further I understand that diving with compressed air involves certain inherent risks; decompression sidues,
embolism. or other hyperbaric injudes can occur that require treatment in a recornpression chamber. I further
understand th the open-water diving tIp, which are neceasry for training and for certification, may be conduct-
ed at a site that Is remote, either by time or diatance or both, from such a recompression chamber. I still choose to
proceed with such instructional dives In spite of the possible absence of a recompression chamber in prodmity to
the dive site.
___ I understand and agree that neither my instructor(s),
the facility through which I received my instruction,
nor Intemational PADI, Inc., nor any of their respective employees, officers, agents or assigns, (hereinafter referred
to as "Released Par e") may be held liable or responsible in any way for any Injury, death, or other damages to
me or my family, heirs, or assigns that may occur as a result of my participation in this diving class or as a result of
the negligence of any party, including the Released Parties, whether passive or active.
_____ In consideration of being allowed to enroll in this course, I hereby personally assume all rises In connection with
said course, for any harm, injury or damage that may befall me while I am enrolled as a student of this course,
including all risks connected therewith, whether foreseen or unforeseen.
___ I further save and hold harmless said course and Released Parties from any claim or lawsuit by me, my family,
estate, heirs, or assigns, arising out of my enrollment and participation in this course including both claims arising
during the course or after I receive my certification.
__ I also understand that skin diving and scuba diving are physically strenuous activities and that I will be exerting
myself during this diving course, and that if I am injured as a result of a heart attack, panic, hyperventilation, etc.,
that I expressly assume the risk of said injuries and that I will not hold the above listed individuals or companies
responsible for the same.
__ I further state that I am of lawful age and legally competent to sign this liability release, or that I have acquired the
written consent of my parent or guardian.
__ I understand that the terms herein are contractual and not a mere recital, and that I have signed this document of
my own free act.
IT IS THE INTENTION OF BY THIS INSTRUMENT 10 EXEMPT AND RELEASE
MY INSTRUCTORS, THE FACILITY THROUGH WHICH I RECEIVED
MY INSTRUCTION, AND INTERNATIONAL PADI, INC.,
AND ALL RELATED ENTITIES AS DEFINED ABOVE, FROM ALL LIABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY WHATSOEVER FOR
PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR WRONGFUL DEATH HOWEVER CAUSED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMIT
ED TO, THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASED PARTIES, WHETHER PASSIVE OR ACTIVE.
I HAVE FULLY INFORMED MYSELF OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS LIABILITY RELEASE AND EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF
RISK BY READING IT BEFORE I SIGNED IT ON BEHALF OF MYSELF AND MY HEIRS.
-Ira-bonii PAD. 1992PROuc NO. 10a2 (R. 3192)
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Exhibit II
300r-1hL TEST P3AAHUE JUMPERASSUPTI OF RISK h0aIN
In consideration of SKYDIVE, INC. DEA Skydive Miami and The Uninsured
Relative Workshop, Incorporated DBA Relative Workshop, hereinafter referred to
as *Corporations,* allowing me the privilege of utilizing a dual harness, dual
parachute pack system owned by the Corporations for the purpose of my performing
an intentional parachute jump, I agree that:
I. REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. I understand that
I will be performing a parachute jump or jumps in an EXPERIMENTAL TEST PROGRAM
under a temporary exemption to the Federal Aviation Regulations, by which
exemption was granted The Uninsured Relative Workshop, Incorporated DBA Relative
Workshop and its representatives to develop safety standards and procedures for
'tandem, parachute jumps by persons wearing a dual harness, dual parachute pack
system. I know and understand the scope, nature and extent of the risks involved
in the activities contemplated by this Agreement and voluntarily and freely
choose to incur such risks, which include physical injury or even death.
2. EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY. I exempt and release the Corporations, their
officers, directors, agents, servants, employees, and shareholders and suppliers
of aircraft airlift as well as the owners of land upon which the parachute
jumping and related aircraft operations are conducted from any and all liability,
claims, demands or actions or causes of action whatsoever arising out of any
damage, loss or injury to me or my property while participating in any of the
activities contemplated by this Agreement, whether such loss, damage, or injury
results from the negligence of the Corporations, its officers, directors, agents,
servants, employees or shareholders or from some other cause.
3. COVENANT NOT TO SUE. I agree never to institute any suit or action at
law or otherwise against the Corporations, their officers, directors, agents,
servants, employees, or shareholders or suppliers of aircraft airlift or against
the owners of land upon which the parachute jumping and related activities are
conducted, nor to initiate any or assist in the prosecution of any claim for
damages or cause of action which I, my heirs, executors or administrators
hereinafter may have by reason of injury to my person of to my property arising
from the activities contemplated by this Agreement.
4. INDEMNITY AGAINST THIRD PARTY CLAIMS. I will indemnify, save and hold
harmless the Corporations, their officers, directors, agents, servants, employees
and shareholders and suppliers of aircraft airlift and the owners of land upon
which these activities are conducted from any and all losses, claims, actions,
or proceedings of every kind and character which may be presented or initiated
by any other persons or organizations and which arise directly or indirectly by
my activities or neglect while engaged in the activities contemplated by this
Agreement. This duty to indemnify includes court costs and reasonable attorney' a
fees incurred in the defense of lawsuits.
5. CONTINUATION OF OBLIGATIONS. I agree and acknowledge that the terms
and conditions of the foregoing EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY, COVENANT NOT TO SUE,
and INDEMNITY AGAINST THIRD PARTY CLAIMS shall continue in force and effect, now
and in the future, at all times during which I participate, either directly or
indirectly, in the activities of the Corporations and shall be binding upon my
heirs, executors and administrators of my estate.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my legal signature
this day of , 1995.
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Exhibit III
The Uninsured Relative workshop, Inc. dibla Relative Workshop
RXPRSTSRNTAT. nar Pnnacnnnr~A B inwPn ABaREK
THIS is as INFORTS LEGAL DOCOM". ALICE YOURSELF
SUFFICIENT TIRE TO CAFU1LLY READ SD DNURETAD THE
ETIRB DOCSEIT, BECAUSE ST SIGNIN IT. TO AS
AORERIEU TO DIVEDUP CarrNi ISOAL RI RS. PLUAS READ
SACS PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY. YOUR -IEITIAL, IEDICAS YOU
REDRRSTSD SND AGRE TO ALL OF ToE IEFUSEATIUE SND
TRM COETAISED TRERSIE. -initial
In consideraiot of the Uninsured Relative Eorkshop Inc.,
doing business as Relative Eorkshop, and Skydive, Inn.
doing busnns as Skydive Wiemi, hereinafter referred to
a -Corporations, allowing a the privilege of utilizing
dual-harnese, dual container parachute peek assembly,
designed, eanufactured and/or assailed by the Uninsnred
Relative Workshop, Inc., d/b/a Relative Workshop, for the
purpose of perfoming an intentional paracnute Jung, I
ar that:
1) Repreentations, Warranties & Aueaptias of Risk:
I understand that I will he performing a parechnte jump or
I upe In an experimental program under temporary eamption
to the Federal Aviation Regulation, Which eetinn o e
granted the Uninsured Relative Eorhehop, Inn. d/b/e
Relative Workshop to develop safety standarde and
procedures for 'edem parachute June by peren wearing
. dual-parechuo peek. I aleo understand that perenhnte
umping Wiii eages e to the rnk of personal injury,
property damage and/or death. I ondereterd that the
sucOeee of my jump ie dependent upon the perfect
functioning Of the airplane fra which I intend to Juop and
the parachute system, end trt neither the airplane nor the
parachute systeR can he guaranteed to function perfectly.
I understand that the airplane and the parachuote system ere
bth euhject to mechanical mlfunction as Wll as operator
error. I freely, voluntarily and expressly choose to
so all riske inherent in parachute jmpIng, including,
but nOt limitod to, risks of equipmnt malfunction and/or
failure to function, including those Which may result from
some defect in design, assebly, and/or manufacture, as
ell as thoe risks arising fran improper and/or negligent
operation and/or use of the equint, for the thrill of
participating in this activity, understanding full nel
that those risk may include personl injury, property
damage, and/or deoth.
I RInitial
2) Eseeptice and Release froe Liability: I eveapt
and rele-a the following persons and organinations:
_ _ Initial
(A) The Corporatione and their officers, directors,
agents, servanto. employee., shareholder., and other
[c ttic eIita
(B) eanufacturera, designers, and suppliers of
Canponent eqipment incorporated in the dual-harness,
dual-container parachunte pek assembly to Which I cili he
atached durin my intentional parachute jump;
-Initial
(C) Oner., suppliers and operators of aircraft frem
ehich I an to make my intentinonal parachute Jump;
_ _ l t-In ie
(D) The owner of the dual-heroes., dual-container
parachute peck assembly, and soy of its -pPonae, to
which I will be attached during my intentional parachote
(a) The operator of the dual-harnee, dual container
perachute peck assembly to Which I will he attached during
I tional hU" Jump,
(F) If I en making my intentional parachute Jump at or
near a perechuting/kydiving facility, the ownere and
operators of that facility, as Well as their officere,
directors. agente, servenot, employeee, shareholders, and
other repreen tivee(
(M) The owners nd lesses. if any, of land upon and
from which the parachute jumping and related aircraft
tratons ere conducted; and
(I) Any other person and/or organization which is or may
he liable for any loss or injury to ma or my property, or
op death, arising out of my participation in any of the
activiies covered by this Agreement (as defined elow);[*I 5 nitial
Frae any and all liability, clam, demands or actione
or taes of action whatooever arising aut of any damage,
loss or injury to e or my property, or my death, whether
occurring while I am training and/or preparing for my
intentional parachute jmp, while I am present in aircraft
from which the jump is to he made, while I a making my
intenional parachute jump, or while I am engaged in
related activities (hereinafter referred to as -activities
covered by this Aqreement'), whether wuch lose. damage,
injury, or death results fra the negligence and/or other
fault, either active or passive, of any of the persona
rod/or organizations described in paragraphs 2 (A) - (H)
above, or from any other cause.
3) Coveeset Ret to Soe: I agree never to institute any
suit or action at la or otherwise against any of the
organizetion and/or persons described in paregreph 2(A)
through (H) above, or to initiate Or assist in the
prosecution of any claim for damge. or cause of action
which I may have by reason of injury to my person or
property, or my death, arising from the activities covered
by this Areant, whlethr oused by the negligence and/or
fault, either active or passive, of any of the
organizations sod/or persons described in paragraph 2(A)
o1rogh (0) above, or fran any other cause. I further
eopreasly agree "hat I will never rmine say claim against
any of the organizations and/or persons described in
paragraph 2(A) through (H) Whove for product liability.
failure to ware, negligence, brach of wrranty, hreach of
contract, or enrict liability, regardless of whether my
claims for damages or injuries are alleged to recolt fran
the fault or negligence of the parties released. I further
ngree that my heirs, executors, administrators, personal
representtives, and/or anyone else claiming on my behalf,
ehall not institute any suit or action at law or otherwise
against any of the organizations and/or persons descried
In paragraph 2 (A) through (H) sbove, nor shall they
ol. 14:1
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initiate or assist the prosecution of any claim for damages
of cause of action which I, my heirs., ezecutor,
administrators, personal representati es., ad/or anyone
else claiming on my behalf may have by reason of injury to
my person or property, or my death arises from the
activities covered by this Areement, whether caused by the
negligence and/or fault, either active or passive, of any
of the organization and/or persona described in paragraph
2(A) through (H) above, or from any other cause, I hereby
so instruct my heirs, executors, administrators, personal
representatives, and/or nyone else claiming on my behalf.
Should any suit or action at law or otherwise by instituted
in violation of this Agreement against soy of the
orgsoizations and/or persons described in paragraph 2 (A)
through (H) above, I agree that such organizations and/or
persuos shall be entitled to recover attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in defense of such suit or action., intuding
[ ltherfrom.
4) Indemnity Against Claims: I will indemnify, save and
hold harmless the organizations and/or persons described
in paragraph 2(A) through (H) above from any and all
losses, claims, actions or proceeding. of every kind and
character, including attorney's feas and expenses, which
may be presented or initiated by any prsona sod/or
organlzations and which arise directly or iodlrectly fnm
my participation in the activities covered by the
Agreement, whether resulting from the negligence and/or
Other fault, either active or passive, or any of the
organizations sod/or persons described in paragraph 2(A)
through (H) above, or from any other cause.
-Inacitial
5) Validity of Nalver: I understand that if I
institute or anyone on my behalf inati~ttes, any suit or
action at law or any claim for damages or cause of action
again.at any of the organizations and/or persons described
in paragraph 2(A) through (H) above because of injury to
my person or property, or my death, due to the activities
covered by this Agreement, this Agreement can and will be
used in court, and that such agreements have been upheld
in courts in similar circumstances.
II 5 c.tial
6) Representatioss and arrantles as to Medinal
Condition: I represent and warrant that (a) I have no
physical infirmity, except those listed below, so not under
treatment for any other physical infirmity or chronic
ailment or injury of any nature, and have never been
reated for any other of the following: cardiac or
pulmonary conditions or disease, diabetes, fainting spells
or convulsions, nervous disorder, kidney or related
dieses, high or low blood pressure: (b) I em not under
any medication of any kind et the present time; and (C) I
do/do not (strike one) wear corrective lenses. If I 00
prescribed corrective lenses, I agree to wear them during
my intentional parachute Jump.
(list infirmities, if none, state 'noon")
7) Naiver of Jury Trial/Applicable
L"w/Venu/Beadlngs: I agree that the law of the State of
Florida ahali apply to issues involving the construction,
interpretation, and validity of this Agreement, and that
Florida law shall govern any dispute between the parties
arising from the activities covered by this Agreement. In
the event this Agreement is violated and suit is brought
against any of the organizations and/or persons described
In paragraph 2 (A) through (H) above, I waive my right to
a jury trial. and agree that Volusia County, Florida shall
be the sole venue for any suit or action arising from tie
activities covered by this Agreemeat. I agree that the
headings and sub-headings ued throughout this Agreement
are for convenience only and have no significance in the
interretston of the body of tis Agreement.
- Initial
8) deverability/Iultiple Saeivra: I agree that should
one or more provisions in this Agreement be judicially
determined to be unenforceable, the remaIning provisions
shall continue to be binding and enforceable against me.
If I have esecuted any other agreement containing
provisions relating to the ezepimon and/or release from
liability and/or covenant sot to sue in connection with the
activities covered by this Agreent, I agree that the
agreement which provides the most protection from liability
and/or suit to the Uninsured Relative Workshop Inc., d/b/a
Relative Workshop shall be enforceable against me by the
Uninsured Relative Workshop, Inc. d/b/a Relative Worshaop.
S-Initiual
9) Cntinuation of Obligatiems: I agree and
acknowledge that the ters and conditions of this
Agrmeent shall continue in force sad effect now and in
the future at all times during which I participate in the
activities covered by this Agreement, and shall be binding
upon my heirs, eaecucors, adlnistrators, personal
representatives, and/or anyon elso claiming on my behalf.
This Agr nt supersedes and replaces any prior such
egreemeat I have signed.
I I -iitial
10) vieling of Videotape: I have viewed and I w.rrant
that I fully undenstand the accompanying 'Tndea Vactor
Walver" video nape.
I freely and voluntarily agree to all of the above by
signing this contract on the day of
1 1995 at the offices of










a Please read each paragraph carefully, Tour initial
indicates you undersand and agree to all of the
linformation and terms contaoined therein.
1997]
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Exhibit IV
ACIOWLZDGXMRT OF RISK, and ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RESPON IBZLITY
WARNING: There are significant elements of risk in any activity associated with outdoor adventures, including but not limited
to bicycling, camping, climbing/hiking/trekking, fishing, hunting, skiing, sledding, swimming, wilderness lodges, and the presence
or use of animals, watercraflt firearms or other weapons and the use of any related equipment (referred to herein as "activity").
Although we have taken reasonable steps to provide you with appropriate equipment and/or skilled guides so you can enjoy an
activity for which you may not be skilled, we wish to remind you this activity is not without risk. Certain risks cannot be
eliminated without destroying the unique character of the activity. The same elements that contribute to the unique character of
the activity can be causes of loss or damage to your equipment, or accidental injury, illness, or in extreme cases, permanent
trauma or death. We do not want to frighten you or reduce your enthusiasm for this activity, but we do think it is important for
you to know in advance what to expect and to be informed of the inherent risks.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RISKS: I acknowledge that the following describes some, but not all, of those risks:I ) Falling;
2) Cold weather and heat related injuries and illnesses including frostnip, frostbite, heat exhaustion, heat stroke,
hypothermia, and dehydration; 3) An "act of nature" which may include avalanche, rock fall, inclement weather,
thunder and lightning, severe and/or varied wind, temperature or weather conditions; 4) River crossings, fordings,
portaging, or travel including travel to or from the activity; 5) Risk associated with crossing, climbing or down-
climbing of rock, snow and/or ice; 6) Equipment failure and/or operator error, 7) Discharge of weapons; 8) Risks
typically associated with watercraft including change in waterflow or current; submerged, semi-submerged and
overhanging objects; capsizing, swamping or sinking of watercraft and resultant injury, hypothermia, or drowning;
9) My sense of balance, physical coordination, and ability to follow instructions; 10) Attack by or encounter with
insects, reptiles, or animals; 11 ) Accidents or illnesses occurring in remote places where there are no available
medical facilities; 12) Fatigue, chill and/or dizziness, which may diminish my/our reaction time and increase the risk
of accident.
I understand the description of these risks is not complete and that unknown or unanticipated risks may result in
injury, illness or death.
EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY: I am aware that this activity entails risks of injury or death
to myself and minor children for which I may be responsible. I agree to assume responsibility for the risks identified herein and
those risks not specifically identified. My/Our participation in this activity is purely voluntary. No one is forcing me/us to
participate and I/we elect to participate in spite of the risks. I am (We are) physically and mentally capable of participating in
the activity and/or safely using the equipment. I accept that wearing a US. C. G. approved personal flotation device for
waterborneactivitiesisa baricsafetyprecaution.I assune full responsibility for the risks of personal injury, accidents or illness,
including but not limited to sprains, tom muscles and/or ligaments; fractured or broken bones; eye damage; cuts, wounds, scrapes,
abrasions, and/or contusions; dehydration, oxygen shortage (anoxia), exposure and/or altitude sickness; head, neck, and/or spinal
injuries; animal or insect bite or attack; injury caused by discharge of any weapon; shock, paralysis, drowning, and/or death; and
any resultant expenses from any of the foregoing risks. I also assume responsibility for damage to or loss of my/our personal
property as the result of any accident that may occur.
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH: I recognize that you, as provider of goods and/or services, will operate under a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, but that you may find it necessary to terminate an activity or refuse or terminate the participation of
any person for the safety of myself and/or other participants. I acknowledge that no guarantees have been made with respect to
achieving objectives.AUTHORIZATION: I hereby authorize any medical treatment deemed necessary in the event of any injury
while participating in the activity. I either have appropriate insurance or, in its absence, agree to pay all costs of rescue and/or
medical services as may be incurred on my/our behalf.
"In consideration of the services of
their officers, agents, employees, and stockholders, and all other persons or entities associated with those businesses, I agree as
follows:
I certify that I am fully capable of participating in this activity. Therefore, I assume and accept full responsibility
for myself, including all minor children in my care, custody, and control, for bodily injury, death, loss of personal
property, and expenses as a result of those inherent risks and dangers identified herein and those inherent risks and
dangers not specifically identified, and as a result of my/our negligence in participating in this activity."
I have read the foregoing acknowledgment of rinks, assumption of risk and responsibility.
Participant's Name (printed)Age Signature
In an emergency, notify (print): Phone:(
List known allergies to medications, plants, or insects:
Advise if under a doctor's care or using any prescription medications:
If the Participant is under 18, the Parent or Legal Guardian must also sign:
AOR12-95)
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